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INTRODUCTION
Modem American sales law is rife with controversy! There is an ongo-
ing debate about such fundamental matters as the scope of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), the rules governing the formation
of sales contracts, the dearth of consumer protections, and the role of the
federal courts in construing the law.2 The recent attempts to revise Arti-
cle 2 have thus far ended in failure, and at this point, it remains unclear
whether sales law in the United States will remain uniform in the years
+ J.D., University of Virginia; M.Phil., Ph.D., Yale University; B.A., M.A., Carleton
University. Address all correspondence to Donald J. Smythe, Associate Professor of Eco-
nomics and Law, Huntley Hall, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA 24450. E-
mail: smythed@wlu.edu
1. This was reflected in the title and subject of the recent Association of American
Law Schools Conference on Commercial Law at the Crossroads, June 14-17, 2005 held in
Montreal, Canada. See AALS Conference on: Commercial Law at the Crossroads,
http://www.aals.org/2005midyear/commercial/index.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
2. See discussion infra Part III.
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ahead.3 Other authors have attributed the current dilemma to the com-
mercial lawmaking process.4 While this Article fully concurs, it argues
that the deficiencies in the commercial lawmaking process are deeply
rooted in the peculiarities of American judicial federalism. The wide
separation of powers over the enactment of new commercial law statutes,
together with an imbalance in the structure of American judicial federal-
ism, have left Article 2 deeply entrenched in the status quo, while at the
same time conferring an unusually wide range of discretion on the federal
courts over the interpretation of state sales statutes.5 As a consequence,
American sales law is being reinterpreted and revised not through the
uniform lawmaking process but through decisions of the federal courts.
From a long-run perspective, what matters most is not so much the sub-
stance of the law itself at any point in time as the mechanisms for adapt-
ing and revising it in the face of the new problems and pressures created
6by social and economic changes. As a general matter, the law can be
revised through the enactment of new statutes or through the decisions of
courts. In a federal system of government such as the one in the United
States, new statutes can be enacted at the federal or state levels, and deci-
sions can be made by both federal and state courts. The Constitution of
the United States clearly assigns the authority to enact statutes in certain
areas of the law to the federal legislature and leaves other areas to the
states.7 The scope of federal authority has expanded quite significantly
over time, however, both because of underlying social and economic
changes and because the Supreme Court has tended to interpret the fed-
eral authorities more broadly (perhaps because of the underlying social
and economic changes).8 Consequently, most commercial law today is
within the scope of the federal government's constitutional authority over
interstate commerce, yet, for historical reasons, most commercial law
statutes are still enacted by state legislatures. 9 It is ironic, therefore, that
the most important source of innovation and change in modern Ameri-
3. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009,
1009-10 (2002).
4. Id. at 1011-12; see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy
of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 638-39 (1995).
5. See discussion infra Part II.
6. This is one of the main themes and concerns of new institutionalist economic
historians such as Douglass North, Gary Libecap, and Lee Alston. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1990).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 160-61 (4th ed. 2001).
This has occurred most notably through an expansion of the federal government's Com-
merce Clause powers. Id. at 160-61, 185-86.
9. See A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
297, 297-300 (2003).
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can sales law is from federal court decisions that reinterpret the state stat-
utes.
It is not, however, without historical precedent. Indeed, the federal
courts frequently sought to fashion general rules of commercial law that
often departed from the state common law throughout the nineteenth
and well into the twentieth centuries. The Supreme Court gave its im-
primatur to their efforts in Swift v. Tyson.1 ° Unfortunately, the federal
courts' efforts failed to bring rationality and uniformity to American
commercial law, and instead exacerbated forum-shopping and its injus-
tices. The Supreme Court ultimately overruled Swift v. Tyson in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, holding that the federal courts must follow state
court precedents on questions of state law. 1 Erie purported to bring an
end to an era in which the federal courts sought to develop a body of
general common law. As other scholars have documented, it was, at best,
a mixed success. 2 It is widely acknowledged that the federal courts con-
tinue to develop a body of general common law through their interpreta-
tions of federal statutes.13
It is less widely acknowledged, however, that the federal courts con-
tinue to play an important role in the development of state law, especially
state commercial law. Indeed, the federal courts continue to render hold-
ings on questions of state law that sometimes clearly contradict state stat-
utes and state court precedents and that subsequently influence the de-
velopment of state law.14 Nowhere is this more glaringly apparent than in
the field of sales law. Ironically, in spite of all of the lofty ideals of judi-
cial federalism that the Supreme Court laid out in Erie, commercial law-
and sales law in particular- remains rooted in the Swift era. Erie may
have clarified that the federal courts are supposed to abide by state court
precedents on questions of state law, but the federal courts continue to
exercise almost unbridled discretion over the interpretation of state
commercial law statutes. In some cases, the courts render holdings that
clearly contradict the statutes in their efforts to bring rationality and co-
herence to modern American sales law.
10. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842).
11. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,79-80 (1938).
12. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503,
504-05 (2006); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 805
(1989).
13. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 504-05.
14. Id. Thus, the federal courts play an important role in the development of state
common law. Id.; see also G. ALAN TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE
SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION 20 (1988) ("Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in 1938 overruling Swift, the impact of federal courts on the common law has
continued.... [B]ecause federal courts confront common law issues, they contribute to the
development of the common law, and state courts may draw upon their rulings in enunciat-
ing common law principles.").
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The first part of this Article offers an overview of modern develop-
ments in American judicial federalism and argues that it has left an im-
balance in the relative powers of the federal and state courts. The second
part draws on the comparative institutional analysis of the separation of
powers in a constitutional democracy to explain how this imbalance in
American judicial federalism has resulted in the federal courts having far
more discretion over the interpretation of state laws than the state courts,
particularly within the sphere of commercial law. On the one hand, this
means that the federal courts have been an important source of experi-
mentation and innovation in the law at a time when new technologies and
commercial practices have created pressures for significant legal reform.
On the other hand, it also means that the federal courts are playing a far
more prominent role in the process of reforming commercial law than
either the state courts or the state legislatures. The third part illustrates
the consequences by examining three prominent areas of controversy in
modem sales law that have arisen from the federal courts' exercise of
their judicial discretion. As the discussion elaborates, the federal courts
have been at the heart of debates about computer software and the scope
of Article 2, the rules governing the formation of sales contracts, and the
consequences of the failure of limited remedy clauses.
I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
Erie was a pivotal case. It shifted the fault lines in the American sys-
tem of judicial federalism and stymied a burgeoning body of federal
common law,16 which was already beginning to spawn an unwholesome
degree of forum-shopping by the early twentieth century.17 The Supreme
Court has subsequently worked out an important body of jurisprudence
governing the appropriate choice between federal and state rules in fed-
eral diversity cases and state cases arising under federal law. It is now
clear that federal courts are supposed to apply state statutes and prece-
dents when answering questions that arise under state law, and state
courts must follow federal statutes and precedents when answering ques-
15. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 504; Weinberg, supra note 12, at 805.
16. This is not to deny that the federal courts still create federal common law through
their interpretations of federal statutes or that they still play an important role in interpret-
ing state law. See Nelson, supra note 12, at 504; Weinberg, supra note 12, at 805-06.
17. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938). As Justice Brandeis wrote:
Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It
made rights enjoyed under the unwritten "general law" vary according to whether en-
forcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of selecting
the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon the non-
citizen....
The discrimination resulting became in practice far-reaching.
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tions that arise under federal law.18 There are, in addition, sophisticated
tests for making the appropriate choices of law when procedural ques-
tions bear on substantive legal outcomes.19
The case law since Erie has thus constructed a framework within which
fundamental questions about the roles of the federal and state courts can
be answered.2 ° In spite of all the nuances of this sophisticated jurispru-
dential edifice, however, there is still a gaping crack in its foundation. If a
state court incorrectly applies federal law, the losing party can, in theory,
appeal the decision all the way to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the Supreme Court therefore has ultimate authority over all
questions arising under federal law.21 If a federal court incorrectly applies
state law in a diversity case, however, the losing party has no right of ap-
peal to the state supreme court, and the state supreme courts do not,
therefore, have ultimate authority over all questions arising under state
law.22 Of course, the federal courts are obliged to follow state statutes
18. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 316-17 (4th ed. 2003). Professor
Chemerinsky summarized the Court's jurisprudence:
[I]f state and federal law are inconsistent, the following questions must be asked.
First, is there a valid federal statute or Federal Rule of procedure on point .... If so,
then the federal law is to be applied, even if there is a conflicting state law. If there is
not a valid [federal] statute or Rule of procedure, the second question is whether the
application of the state law in question is likely to determine the outcome of the law-
suit. If the state law is not outcome determinative, then federal law is used. But if the
state law is deemed to be outcome determinative, then the third question is asked: Is
there an overriding federal interest justifying the application of federal law?
Id.
19. In addition to Erie, the Court has developed a series of tests to answer compli-
cated questions that arise *'hen federal courts must decide whether to follow federal or
state procedures in diversity cases. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467-68 (1965)
(holding that in the absence of a federal rule or statute, a federal court should follow the
state practice if following the federal practice would lead to forum-shopping or inequitable
administration of the laws); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 536-37
(1958) (finding that if the state practice is bound up with the definition of the rights and
obligations of the parties, a federal court should follow state practice; if not, a federal court
may follow federal practice if there are affirmative countervailing considerations of federal
judicial administration); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (holding that, in
diversity cases, the outcome of the litigation should be substantially the same as if tried in a
state court). The Court has modified Guaranty Trust and developed a multilayered ap-
proach that inquires first into the existence of relevant federal procedural rules and then
applies a modified outcome determinative test. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
20. See Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal
Predictions of State Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 971 (1996).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
22. The state courts might have the opportunity to overrule a federal holding on a
question of state law if the same question happens to subsequently come before them.
Although that has happened, it is far from likely and will not necessarily result in a reopen-
ing of the case. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 38 F.3d 1266, 1269 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Richard
H. Lipton, Comment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards for Relief from
Judgments Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 646-48 (1976); Recent Devel-
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and precedents, and if novel questions arising under state law come be-
fore them, the courts are supposed to predict how the state supreme
court would respond." Moreover, some states allow federal courts to
certify questions to the state supreme court for definitive interpretations
of state law.24 In practice, however, the imbalance has given the federal
courts degrees of freedom in interpreting state law that the state courts
do not have in interpreting federal law.2' This has had especially signifi-
cant consequences for recent developments in commercial law, and lies at
the heart of the controversy over recent attempts to amend Article 2 of
the UCC.
It is easy to forget that Swift v. Tyson was a commercial law case.6 Un-
der the doctrine the Supreme Court established in Swift, federal courts
sought to achieve uniformity in commercial law through holdings that
looked beyond the narrow provincialism of any one state's laws.27 In this
opment, Pierce v. Cook. Rule 60(b) (6) Relief from Judgment for Change of State Law in a
Diversity Case, 62 VA. L. REV. 414, 414, 418 (1976). But see Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518
F.2d 720, 723-24 (10th Cir. 1975).
Some states allow federal courts to certify questions of state law to the state supreme
court for an answer, but this procedure is not always available, and there is no requirement
that the federal courts must take advantage of it even if it is available. See generally
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 221-53 (6th ed. 2004).
23. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237-338 (1943); see also Comm'r v. Es-
tate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) ("If there be no decision by [the state supreme
court] then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving
'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect, it may be
said to be, in effect, sitting as a state court."). The Supreme Court has held that a federal
court may not decline to hear a case simply because of uncertainty as to the relevant state
law. Meredith, 320 U.S. at 237-38. This peculiar arrangement-invited the following quip by
Judge Friendly in Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, a case that raised a difficult question
about the choice of state law in a federal diversity case: "Our principal task... is to deter-
mine what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on an issue
about which neither has thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280, 281 (2d
Cir. 1960), set aside, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
24. See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 22-24 (5th ed. 2004) (stating that the majority of states allow
certification).
25. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges'
Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 975-76 (2004). The losing party in a
federal diversity case could always appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the
federal court's interpretation of state law violated Erie, but the Supreme Court would be
extremely unlikely to grant a writ of certiorari in such a case. Id.
26. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 19 (1842).
27. Id. In Swift, the Court held that the section of the Judiciary Act that directed the
federal courts to look to "the laws of the several states" for legal authorities in diversity
cases was meant to be "strictly limited to local statutes and local usages," and that it did
not extend to "contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature, the true interpreta-
tion and effect whereof are to be sought, not in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in
the general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence." Id. at 18-19; see also
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 369-70 (1910) (extending the doctrine to prop-
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regard, their decisions reflected the dominant jurisprudential tradition of
the time. Under the theory of natural law that prevailed during the an-
tebellum period, certain legal principles were thought to transcend juris-
dictional boundaries and provide rules of law common to all courts in all
jurisdictions.29 This was especially true in the area of commercial law,
which was thought to be rooted in the ancient law of the merchant and
governed by usage of trade and underlying principles of commerce.0 In
appealing to these broader authorities, federal judges simply believed
they were constructing their interpretations of the law correctly, rather
than devising a separate body of federal commercial law. 31 Indeed, there
was an understanding of the great value of uniformity in commercial laws
implicit in their appeal to these broader principles.32 When federal courts
rendered holdings that rejected or ignored state court holdings, they were
trying to achieve legal unification through the development of a system of
"general commercial law" that cohered with the underlying principles of
commercial transactions.33
Federal court holdings on state questions that clearly diverged from
state authorities were not, however, consistent with twentieth century
theories of democracy and judicial restraint.34 Indeed, the current imbal-
erty law disputes); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 370-71 (1893) (extend-
ing the doctrine to questions of tort law).
28. See MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870-
1960, at 156 (1992).
29. Id. The medieval conception of natural law, which was based on the "premise that
any positive law that violated natural law was void," had long since been marginalized. Id.
In the classical legal jurisprudence that emerged in the nineteenth century, "natural rights
discourse structured legal argument by suggesting starting points, background assump-
tions, presumptions, or first principles in the law." Id. at 158.
30. See generally WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLISH LAW 160-75
(1938) (stating that the great British jurist, Lord Mansfield, attempted to institutionalize
the reference to mercantile custom by relying on a jury of merchants). But cf K.N. Lle-
wellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939) (noting that the law of
sales has never been fully incorporated into the mercantile system).
31. See Weinberg, supra note 12, at 824 (stating that in Swift, Justice Story "was aim-
ing for uniform commercial law-and better commercial law than he found under the...
common law of New York").
32. Id.
33. Justice Story, who wrote the Court's opinion in Swift, had earlier been an advo-
cate of legal codification in Massachusetts. See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of
Codification in the Common-Law World, 25 YALE J. INT'L L. 435, 498-99 (2000). Justice
Story held that federal courts could declare rules for "general commercial law" in a man-
ner consistent with Lord Mansfield's dictum that commercial law is "not the law of a single
country only, but of the commercial world." Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1842). One
scholar observed that "Story hoped ... uniformity would follow." Weinberg, supra note
12, at 824.
34. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72 (1938) ("The federal courts [under Swift]
assumed, in the broad field of 'general law,' the power to declare rules of decision which
Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes."). At least until some time
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ance in judicial federalism is also inconsistent with fundamental princi-
ples of democracy and judicial restraint, since it allows federal courts to
render holdings on state questions that are not subject to a right of appeal
to the state supreme courts.3 ' This places these holdings beyond the sys-
tem of checks and balances that normally helps to ensure judicial ac-
countability and restrain the scope of judicial discretion in a constitu-
tional democracy.36 The federal courts have exercised their discretion
quite freely, particularly in interpreting Article 2." While this has pro-
moted experimentation and innovation in the law and militated against
legal obsolescence, it has also begun to undermine the uniformity of
American sales law.38
II. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION
A. Comparative Institutional Analysis
In any constitutional democracy, some degree of discretion must be ac-
corded to the judiciary. There can be no rule of law unless the courts
have the authority to interpret statutes and precedents free from the con-
trol of political officials.39 Yet, if the courts were granted complete
autonomy to interpret the laws without any checks against their exercise
of discretion or any system of judicial accountability, they could fashion
the laws without regard to the will of the electorate, and the rule of law
in the twentieth century, it was clear that the federal government's commerce powers did
not extend to all commercial activities. Nonetheless, Swift authorized the federal courts to
create general commercial law without regard to the scope of federal commerce powers.
Swift, 41 U.S. at 18-19. This was the unconstitutional course of conduct authorized by
Swift to which Justice Brandeis alluded in Erie. Erie, 304 U.S. at 77-78.
35. See discussion infra Part II.
36. See discussion infra Part II.
37. See discussion infra Part III.
38. Cf Erie, 304 U.S. at 74 ("Persistence of state courts in their own opinions on ques-
tions of common law prevented uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfac-
tory line of demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law devel-
oped a new well of uncertainties." (footnote omitted)). Indeed, divergent judicial deci-
sions have frustrated the objectives of commercial codification since the turn of the twenti-
eth century. See WALTER P. ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF SERVICE: A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS 50 (1991). The argument below suggests, however, that the inordinate discretion of
the federal courts on questions of state law has created very particular problems for the
development of sales law.
39. See ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 228 (2000). As
Cooter notes, the system of justice in a dictatorship, such as the former Soviet Union, has
been referred to as "telephone justice," presumably to invoke the metaphor of the execu-
tive telephoning a judge to direct her disposition of a case. Id.
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could become little more than a facade for totalitarianism.40 The Framers
of the U.S. Constitution thought very carefully about the role of the judi-
ciary as well as the legislative and executive branches of government, and
sought to restrain the power of each through a well-defined system of
checks and balances.' Indeed, the system of government the Framers
devised was a creative and original response to the potential pitfalls in a
republican form of government. 42 In that regard, the U.S. Constitution
was an experiment in democracy, as well as the product of political the-
43
ory and compromise.
The U.S. Constitution thus provides a useful model for understanding
the role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. The Framers in-
vested legislative powers in the Congress, but divided them between the
House of Representatives and the Senate."4 Moreover, the President was
40. In a true theocracy, for instance, there is no separation of powers, and all branches
of government are subordinate to the law of the prevailing religion. A theocracy may,
therefore, veer toward a kind of totalitarianism in which the people are subordinate to the
legal dictates of their religious leaders. See MANFRED HALPERN, THE POLITICS OF
SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 134-55 (1963) (coining the
term "neo-Islamic totalitarianism" to refer to the Muslim fundamentalist forces at play in
the Middle East over forty years ago). That characterization has been challenged. See,
e.g., Michael Whine, Islamism and Totalitarianism: Similarities and Differences,
TOTALITARIAN MOVEMENTS & POL. RELIGIONS, Fall 2001, at 54. However, in light of
recent experience in the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan under the Taliban re-
gime, the analogy remains highly relevant.
41. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary
in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975) (arguing that an independent
and neutral judiciary is essential to enforcing the bargains between competing interests in
the democratic process). From the perspective offered here, it is naive to think that the
judiciary can be truly independent and neutral. Id. at 875-76. Indeed, the separation of
powers between the executive and legislative branches inevitably confers political power
on the judiciary. Id. at 879. As long as the judicial appointment process is subject to po-
litical control, therefore, it will be impossible for the judiciary to remain truly independent
and neutral. Id.
42. See Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The
Process of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 406 (1993).
43. The actual history of the Constitutional Convention reminds one of the old quip
about sausages -"better eaten than seen in the making" - but the outcome was a re-
markably intricate and novel legal document, whether by design, happenstance, or some-
thing in between. See generally CAROL BERKIN, A BRILLIANT SOLUTION: INVENTING
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 4-10 (2002); CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE
AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO
SEPTEMBER 1787, at 3-14 (1966); CHARLES L. MEE, JR., THE GENIUS OF THE PEOPLE 1-4
(1987).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1-7; see Saul Levmore, Bicameralism: When Are Two Deci-
sions Better Than One?, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 145, 145 (1992) (arguing that the sepa-
ration of legislative powers between an upper and lower house also has important implica-
tions for the relative powers of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches). A separa-
tion of legislative powers between two houses in a bicameral legislature increases the diffi-
culty of a legislative bargain; it thus also makes it less likely that the legislature will be able
to override any veto of new legislation by the executive branch, or that it will be able to
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given the power to veto new legislation, subject to a two-thirds majority
override.45 This veto provision confers some de facto legislative power on
the executive branch of government. Any new legislation requires a bar-
gain between both houses of Congress as well as the President. 46 At least
fifty percent of the members of each of the two houses of the legislature
and the President must agree to the bargain;47 if the President refuses to
participate in the bargain and vetoes the new legislation, then a bargain
between two-thirds of the members of the two houses is necessary to
override the veto and enact the new legislation. 48 This separation of pow-
ers ensures that all new legislation will have a broad base of political sup-
port.49 It also means that new legislation is difficult to enact, and that the
American system of government tends to favor the status quo.
The American system of government favors the status quo, not only
because the U.S. Constitution requires so much legislative bargaining to
enact any new proposals, but also because legislative bargaining is
costly.0 The political parties' control of the House and Senate is not
strong enough to ensure that members will vote along party lines. There-
fore, legislators' votes often have to be "bought" with promises of sup-
port for the legislators' own favored initiatives, important committee as-
signments, or a myriad of other favors, both small and large.5 The trans-
actions required to gain legislative support for any new proposal will usu-
ally consume a significant amount of the legislators' scarce time and en-
ergy. These transaction costs may well preclude many potentially gain-
ful bargains and inhibit legislative enactments.53 In general, the higher
enact a statutory amendment to overrule judicial interpretations of the law that depart
from legislative intent. Id. at 151-59.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
46. See COOTER, supra note 39, at 215-25 (presenting a bargaining model).
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
48. Id.
49. See COOTER, supra note 39, at 239. Of course, the broad base of political support
might derive in large measure from bargains among the legislators. Id. at 223-25. Lobby
groups and special interests will often succeed in having special interest legislation enacted
but usually as part of some omnibus bill. Id. at 221. In fact, the possibility of enacting
special interest legislation in such a manner increases the potential scope of legislative
bargains. If a coalition of legislators is too small to force a bill through the legislature, they
might be able to "buy" other legislators' support by promising to attach special interest
legislation that provides specific benefits to the other legislators' constituency (e.g., fund-
ing for a new bridge or a new research institute). Id. at 223-24. This kind of "pork barrel
politics" is often the subject of derision, but, ironically, it can help to facilitate the enact-
ment of other socially desirable legislation. Of course, if the entire legislative process is
dominated by special interests, there is little hope that the outcomes will serve the public
welfare. Id. at 213-15.
50. Id.
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the transaction costs of legislative bargaining, the more the legislative
process favors the status quo.
The separation of powers between the executive and legislative
branches, and the transaction costs of legislative bargaining, have an im-
plicit effect on the powers of the judiciary. The scope of judicial discre-
tion is ultimately constrained in two ways: first, by the power of the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches to overrule controversial judicial hold-
ings by enacting new legislation; second, by the powers of the executive
and legislative branches over judicial appointments.54 Since the U.S.
Constitution separates the power to enact new legislation so widely, the
political bargains necessary to overrule the courts will be difficult to
achieve. Thus, American courts generally have a wide range of discretion
to interpret the federal laws-a much wider range of discretion than the
courts in many other countries.55 Indeed, not all constitutions require so
much bargaining to enact new legislation. In the British political system,
for instance, the executive (the Prime Minister) is the member of the leg-
islature (Parliament) who has the support of a majority of its members.5
There is no separation of powers between the executive and legislative
branches, and thus, new legislation does not require as difficult and costly
a bargain as in the United States.57 In general, therefore, British courts
can be overruled more easily than American courts, and the British po-
litical system does not confer as much discretion on the courts as the
American political system.
5 8
The wide scope of judicial discretion in the United States has made the
judicial appointment process (at the federal level, at least) much more
political than in Great Britain and Europe. 9 Indeed, in keeping with the
theory of checks and balances upon which the U.S. Constitution was
54. Id. at 225-34.
55. See Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Division of Powers in the European Con-
stitution (Berkeley Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 106, 1997); J. Mark
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics
from Japan (Univ. of Chicago, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 37, 1995), available
at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=10046.
56. See JOHN KINGDOM, GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN 326 (1991) (pro-
viding an overview of the British political system).
57. See id. at 326-28, 332-33.
58. See COOTER, supra note 39, at 229. Indeed, the scope of judicial discretion in the
United States is manifested most evidently in matters of constitutional law. The U.S. Con-
stitution requires a much more difficult and costly bargain to amend the Constitution than
to enact new federal legislation. U.S. CONsT. art. V. This fragmentation of the power to
amend the Constitution has significantly enhanced the discretion of the Supreme Court in
matters of constitutional interpretation. As a result, appointments to the Supreme Court
have become highly politicized. See generally John Ferejohn, Judicializing Politics, Politi-
cizing Law, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41 (2002) (analyzing the relationship between
political fragmentation and judicial power).
59. Ferejohn, supra note 58, at 64-65.
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based, the Framers also separated the power over federal judicial ap-
pointments between the executive and legislative branches.6 The Presi-
dent was given the power to nominate federal judges and Supreme Court
Justices and the Senate was given the power of advice and consent.61 Of
course, the rules governing the tenure and terms of appointment for
judges, the circumstances under which they can be impeached, and the
assignment of the powers of reappointment are also important to the re-
62straint of judicial discretion. The U.S. Constitution confers lifetime ten-
ure on the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States,63 as well as
federal judges.6'
As long as the judicial branch is truly independent, the judiciary will
exercise some degree of discretion in any constitutional democracy. 6 If
the power to enact new legislation is separated very widely, and if there
are no limits on the tenure and terms of appointment of judges and Su-
preme Court Justices, the judiciary will tend to have a wide range of dis-
cretion.66 It will be able to exercise this discretion to interpret the laws in
ways that the executive and legislative branches did not intend and are
therefore not in accord with democratic principles, narrowly conceived. 67
It will also be able to exercise its discretion to break the law free of the
status quo. In this regard, separation of powers allows the judicial branch
to serve as a source of legal innovation and experimentation, and offer an
important check against legal obsolescence.6g
Guido Calabresi has used the term "legal obsolescence" to characterize
the problem that arises when a statute is ill-fitted to modem circum-
stances and lacks legislative support.69 He argues that obsolescent stat-
60. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
61. Id.
62. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. If a judge is subject to periodic reappointment or
impeachment for abuse of discretion, she may be inhibited from interpreting statutes in
ways that were clearly not intended and might therefore offend the executive and legisla-
tive branches or draw public attention and criticism. If her tenure is short, she may quickly
be replaced with a judge who exercises less discretion.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See COOTER, supra note 39, at 231-34.
66. See id. at 225-29.
67. See iL at 231-34. One could argue, of course, that some judicial discretion is es-
sential in any true constitutional democracy and that its exercise is not necessarily contrary
to democratic principles, except perhaps in the narrowest sense.
68. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 2 (1982).
69. Id. Calabresi explains:
There is an alternate way of dealing with the problem of legal obsolescence: grant-
ing to courts the authority to determine whether a statute is obsolete, whether in one
way or another it should be consciously reviewed. At times this doctrine would ap-
proach granting to courts the authority to treat statutes as if they were no more and
no less than part of the common law. At other times it would be used to enable courts
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utes often cannot be revised or repealed, presumably because of the diffi-
culties of achieving the legislative bargain necessary to enact new legisla-
tion.70 Most interestingly, Calabresi argues that the exercise of judicial
discretion can help to alleviate the problem.7' From his perspective, the
wide separation of legislative powers and the transaction costs of legisla-
tive bargaining not only cause legal obsolescence, they also confer discre-
tion on the judiciary that the judiciary can-and should-use to militate
against the legal obsolescence . It is difficult to dispute his claim that the
wise use of judicial discretion over the interpretation of obsolete statutes
could increase social welfare.73 Of course, it is easy to imagine how the
ill-advised use of that discretion could be socially detrimental. 74
The U.S. Constitution constrains the federal government from using
the terms of appointment for Supreme Court Justices and federal judges
to limit the scope of discretion exercised by the federal courts.75 The
scope of the state courts' judicial discretion depends largely, of course, on
the separation of powers in their respective state constitutions and the
transaction costs of bargaining within the state political systems.76 Al-
though most states' constitutions separate the power to enact new legisla-
tion in a manner similar to the U.S. Constitution, the states generally
limit the tenure of state supreme court justices and state judges.77 There-
fore, control over appointment and tenure is a much more important
check against the exercise of judicial discretion at the state level than the
federal level.78 Since many state judges and justices are elected, this con-
trol is often exercised by state voters.79
The state constitutions and governments therefore typically exercise
more restraint over state judiciaries than the Federal Constitution and
government exercise over the federal judiciary.' ° Moreover, the relatively
high transaction costs of political bargaining at the federal level, on both
to encourage, or even to induce, legislative reconsideration of the statute.... The ob-
ject in all cases would be to permit courts to keep anachronistic laws from governing
us without thereby requiring them to do tasks for which they are not suited, or deny-
ing to the legislatures the decisive word in the making of constitutionally valid laws.
Id. (footnote omitted).
70. See id. at 70-72.
71. Id. at 164-65.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 3-5.
74. Id. at 167-70.
75. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
76. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 14, at 44-45.
77. See id. at 64.
78. See F. Andrew Hanssen, The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the
Rate of Litigation: The Election Versus Appointment of State Judges, 28 J. LEG. STUD. 205,
209-10 (1999).
79. Id. at 209-11.
80. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 14, at 50-51.
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constitutional and legislative matters, probably allows the federal judici-
ary to exercise more discretion on federal legal questions than the state
judiciaries can exercise on state legal questions.8' Of course, if state
courts misapply federal law they can always be overruled by the Supreme
Court, and as a result, this also constrains the state courts' exercise of
discretion on questions of federal law." But there is no similar constraint
on the federal courts' exercise of their discretion over questions of state
law.Y In practice, the federal courts' discretion over questions of state
law is virtually unchecked by any system of accountability to elected offi-
cials-state or federal.8 Of course, the state legislatures have the power
to overrule errant federal court interpretations of state statutes; but on
questions of commercial law, where the states have subordinated their
usual legislative autonomy to a uniform lawmaking process, this check
against the federal judicial power is virtually ineffective. 85
B. The Uniform Lawmaking Process and the Inordinate Discretion of the
Federal Courts
The peculiar history of uniform lawmaking in the United States has re-
sulted in the federal courts having more discretion over the interpretation
of the commercial laws than the state courts. The U.S. Constitution con-
fers authority over interstate commerce on the federal government, 86 but
otherwise leaves matters of contract, property, torts, and crime to the
states.Y7 Commercial law has thus traditionally been within the states'
sphere of authority. This was a workable arrangement in the eighteenth
century and even into the nineteenth century, before the canals and rail-
roads created a truly national market. However, by the late nineteenth
century, as the mass-production manufacturing industries emerged in the
wake of the transportation revolution that allowed firms to sell their
81. See COOTER, supra note 39, at 211-29. Since federal legislators represent much
more diverse regions and interests than state legislators, the transaction costs of bargaining
among them is generally higher. See id.
82. TARR & PORTER, supra note 14, at 7-9.
83. Id. at 11-12.
84. Id.
85. See infra Part II.B.
86. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. X. The U.S. Constitution does not specifically grant
"police powers" to the states, but the Tenth Amendment reserves powers not specially
granted to the federal government for the states. See id. Thus, police powers-those con-
cerning health, morals, and well-being-have traditionally been construed as within the
states' sphere of authority. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 274 (1918) (de-
claring unconstitutional a federal law that restricted interstate shipments of goods pro-
duced using child labor).
[Vol. 56:451
2007] Commercial Law in the Cracks of Judicial Federalism 465
products in distant states,88 the pressures to unify the law of commerce
across the states became much more intense.8 It was not clear, however,
whether the interstate commerce powers of the federal government were
sufficiently broad to justify commercial codification and unification
through federal legislation; most late-nineteenth century business and
political leaders believed they were not.9 Regardless, there were signifi-
cant political impediments to federalizing commercial law throughout the
twentieth century.91
The initial impetus to unify the commercial laws manifested itself
through the newly formed American Bar Association (ABA)?2 In 1881,
the Alabama Bar Association created a committee to make recommen-
dations about legal unification and to advance the cause in other states.93
88. For overviews of these developments, see ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE
AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 53-63 (1990); ALFRED D.
CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS 209-15 (1977); DAVID C. MOWERY & NATHAN ROSENBERG, TECHNOLOGY
AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 35-38 (1989).
89. Kevin M. Teeven, A History of Legislative Reform of the Common Law of Con-
tract, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 35, 69 (1994). The American Bar Association, which was instru-
mental in establishing the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
first formed the ABA Committee on Uniform Laws in 1891. ARMSTRONG, supra note 38,
at 20; see also Weiss, supra note 33, at 503-07 (explaining the drafting of the first Penal
Code, Political Code, and Civil Code).
90. The Supreme Court may have expanded the scope of federal commerce powers in
Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-402 (1905), enough to bring much commer-
cial activity within the scope of the federal government, but many observers clearly be-
lieved that the power to regulate commerce was reserved for the states well into the twen-
tieth century. In a New York Times article from 1910, for instance, Seth Low suggested
that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to confer power over commercial law
on the federal government: "Under our Federal system we can obtain uniformity of statu-
tory law in only one of two ways. We can give, by constitutional amendment, addition [sic]
and exclusive power to Congress; or we must develop the capacity and the habit in the
separate States of acting together ...... Uniform State Laws Advocated by Taft, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1910, at 8.
91. See V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS 332-35 (1949). The resistance to federal
encroachment on areas of traditional state authority, often manifested in the rhetoric of
"states' rights," drew much of its vigor from white racists' attempts to suppress blacks' civil
rights well into the twentieth century. Id. As Lynn A. Baker and Ernest A. Young ob-
served, "[tihe notion of states' rights today continues to suffer mightily under the weight of
[this] association." Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Stan-
dard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 143 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But the assertion of states' rights has also tended to serve other political interests. See L.
HARMON ZEIGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 46-47 (1964) (noting that
business interests often find they are relatively more influential with state governments
than the federal government). According to Zeigler, "federalism does not involve a strug-
gle between the nation and the states, but rather a struggle among interests who have
favorable access to one of the two levels of government." Id. at 48.
92. See ARMSTRONG, supra note 38, at 20.
93. Id. at 16.
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Then, in 1889, L.D. McFarland, the president of the Tennessee Bar Asso-
ciation, advocated in his annual address a process for achieving legal uni-
fication across the states. 4 McFarland's address led to the establishment
of a committee, which advanced the issue at the ABA's annual meeting
in Chicago in 1889.9' The president of the ABA at the time was David
Dudley Field, who had already drafted the "Field Code" and was a strong
advocate of legal codification. 96 He appointed a special committee to
investigate the matter further.97 Although attendance at the special
committee meetings was poor, the committee submitted a report to the
ABA which recommended the ABA request that its members prepare
bills for passage in their state legislatures providing for the appointment
of commissioners to advance the uniformity of state laws.98
In 1890, the ABA adopted a resolution that accepted the committee's
recommendations and led to the establishment of the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). 9  The
NCCUSL's mandate was to further the codification and unification of
laws across the states by sponsoring the drafting of model legal codes and
encouraging state legislatures to adopt them.1°° It initially sponsored a
series of model commercial codes, many of which were drafted by legal
academics, including the Uniform Sales Act, which was drafted by Sam-
uel Williston. 1 The NCCUSL process, however, was one that left formal
authority over commercial laws to the state governments, and few of the
model commercial codes were widely adopted as drafted.02 Moreover,
the objectives of legal unification appeared to be frustrated from early on
by divergent judicial interpretations of the uniform statutes.'03
94. Id. at 17-18.
95. Id. at 18.
96. See id.; Weiss, supra note 33, at 503-05.
97. ARMSTRONG, supra note 38, at 18.
98. Id. at 18-19.
99. Id. Not all states rushed to appoint commissioners; indeed, some states had not
yet appointed any by the turn of the century. The NCCUSL nonetheless was able to pro-
ceed with its business. Id.
100. Id. at 27. The NCCUSL is funded primarily from state appropriations, but also
from the ABA, various foundations, interest groups, and federal agencies. Id. at 29.
101. Id. at 32.
102. Id. at 50.
103. Id. In his annual address as NCCUSL president in 1914, Charles T. Terry stated:
[T]here has been as pronounced a tendency to divergence in the decisions of the
courts as there has been in the enactment of statutes in the respective states. This has
not been a conscious tendency.., but it has been none the less alarming. It has been
a menace to the accomplishment of our purpose, of such grave proportions, as to con-
vince us that the attainment of our end would be jeopardized, unless some means
could be found to mitigate or check the tendency.
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The NCCUSL initially sought to enhance uniformity in the judicial in-
terpretations of its bills by including within them provisions that man-
dated uniformity in interpretation.' ° The problem persisted, however,
and in 1929 the NCCUSL published a report on the various judicial deci-
sions interpreting the Negotiable Instruments Law, which had been one
of its most widely adopted uniform model codes.05 The NCCUSL ob-
served: "The whole fabric, the very conception of uniformity, was being
menaced by the strange attitude of the courts.... [T]he courts, on identi-
cal statutes, were reaching diametrically opposite conclusions; cases from
other states on the precise point were being ignored; the very statute was
ofttimes neglected .... ."'06 Although this was well before the Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Erie, the observation might just as
easily have been stated in a much more recent report.1 7
The early attempts at commercial codification were thus a mixed suc-
cess at best.1 18 Well before the middle of the twentieth century, however,
a series of Supreme Court opinions made it clear that the federal gov-
ernment's commerce powers were sufficient for commercial codification
to proceed through federal legislation.'9 Some influential lawyers and
academics began to advocate unification of sales law through federal leg-
islation. ° In 1922, the ABA drew on Samuel Williston's talents to help
104. Id. at 51.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 51-52.
107. The Supreme Court acknowledged the challenge that divergent interpretations
posed to commercial uniformity well before Erie. In Commercial National Bank of New
Orleans v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 239 U.S 520 (1916), Justice Hughes wrote:
It is apparent that if these Uniform Acts are construed in the several States adopting
them according to former local views upon analogous subjects, we shall miss the de-
sired uniformity and we shall erect upon the foundation of uniform language separate
legal structures as distinct as were the former varying laws.
Id. at 528.
108. ARMSTRONG, supra note 38, at 50.
109. E.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398-99 (1905) (adopting the
stream of commerce doctrine). According to David Gordon, the stream of commerce
doctrine "laid the foundation for much of twentieth-century constitutional history." David
Gordon, Swift & Co. v. United States: The Beef Trust and the Stream of Commerce Doc-
trine, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 244, 279 (1984). It was not immediately clear that Swift ex-
panded the scope of federal commerce power enough for the federal government to enact
commercial laws, but the Supreme Court subsequently upheld federal legislation in what
had traditionally been state areas of authority in a number of other cases. See, e.g., NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 6-10 (1937); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495,
528 (1922).
110. E.g., K.N. Llewellyn, The Needed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 558, 561
(1939-40).
Catholic University Law Review
draft a federal sales bill."' Although this was never enacted, powerful
interests groups such as the Merchant's Association of New York contin-S• 112
ued to lobby for federal action. Some prominent academics, such as
Karl Llewellyn, also advocated unification through federal legislation."3
However, William L. Snyder, the president of the NCCUSL at the time
and a states' rights advocate, urged further attempts at unification
through the NCCUSL process.1 4 The NCCUSL, in conjunction with the
American Law Institute (ALI), subsequently initiated the Uniform
Commercial Code project. 15 The UCC was subsequently adopted by all
states, and became the first (and only) true success of the NCCUSL-ALI
lawmaking process. "6 Proponents of states' rights, who had often resisted
codification through the NCCUSL process, were finally forced to con-
cede to commercial codification. They conceded because of fear that, if
they successfully resisted further attempts through the NCCUSL-ALI
process working at the state level, legislation would be enacted at the
federal level, and the states would suffer a further erosion of their tradi-
tional spheres of authority."'
The peculiar history of legal codification in the United States has re-
sulted in a peculiar institutional framework for commercial lawmaking.
The states retain formal authority over commercial law, but de facto au-
thority over commercial law amendments has been delegated to the
NCCUSL-ALI lawmaking process."' This has worked well enough for
111. Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 95 n.46
(1993).
112. Id. at 53.
113. Llewellyn, supra note 110, at 561. Llewellyn was by this time skeptical about the
possibility of achieving uniform commercial laws through state legislation:
To prepare amendments to the Uniform Sales Act is possible, and is desirable. But
merely to set those amendments on the road to adoption, State by State, is to throw
new confusion into the field of interstate commerce. After thirty-four years, we still
have one or another variety of non-uniform "common" law in sixteen States .... The
only practicable road to real uniformity... is by Congressional action ....
Id.
114. ARMSTRONG, supra note 38, at 57.
115. Id. For a detailed description of the NCCUSL-ALI drafting process, see Schwartz
& Scott, supra note 4, at 600-01.
116. ARMSTRONG, supra note 38, at 53.
117. See id. (stating that Erie was also a key factor because it "erased the rickety frame-
work of Federal common law which had served as a unifying factor for commercial law
since 1842, causing the Merchants Association of New York City to press for Federal ac-
tion in that field, avoidance of which ultimately resulted in the Uniform Commercial
Code").
118. See Fred H. Miller, UC.C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in Process and Scope, 42
ALA. L. REV. 405,406 (1991).
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most parts of the UCC, but not for Article 2."9 As the recent attempts to
amend Article 2 have shown, the wide range of interests at stake and the
wide bargain required for any successful amendments preclude the proc-
ess from producing truly substantive changes.2 The only amendments
that can survive the bargaining process are the ones that are noncontro-
versial, and thus, there is little incentive for state legislatures to enact
them.121 Indeed, even if the NCCUSL-ALI process did produce meaning-
ful amendments to Article 2, lobbying by interested business and con-
sumer groups at the state level would probably impede many state legis-
latures from adopting them, and the uniformity of the code would be
compromised anyway.'2 The de facto power over the enactment of new
sales legislation has been far too widely separated to permit an easy revi-
sion process.
The diffuse power over the enactment of new sales legislation confers a
wide range of discretion over the interpretation of Article 2 on both the
federal and state courts.' 3 In practice, however, the range of discretion
conferred upon the federal courts is much broader than that conferred
upon the state courts. 24 Federal judges and Supreme Court Justices are
appointed by the President1 5 Barring any cause for impeachment, these
judges may serve indefinitely126 They are not subject to periodic review
or reappointment. l27 Even if they were, they would be subject to reap-
pointment by the President rather than state officials. State judges and
119. Financial industry interests clearly dominate the amendment processes for Arti-
cles 3, 4, and 9. See id. at 407; Patchel, supra note 111, at 120-23 (1993); Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 4, at 639. They also tend to be highly influential in the state legislatures. See
DONALD C. BLAISDELL, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY UNDER PRESSURE 48 (1957); Ronald
J. Hrebenar, Change, Transition, and Growth in Southern Interest Group Politics, in
INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES 321, 337-39 (Ronald J. Hrebenar
& Clive S. Thomas eds., 1992). This facilitates revisions to Articles 3, 4, and 9 but possibly
at the expense of consumer and other nonfinancial interests.
120. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 597, 645-48 (observing that the recent
amendments to Article 2 were produced by a study group that was dominated by reform-
ers, proposing vague standards instead of bright-line rules). Schwartz and Scott correctly
predicted that the process would fail.
121. Id. at 597.
122. The states have certainly not rushed to adopt the recent amendments to Article 2,
even though they are hardly as significant as many had hoped.
123. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 606 (noting that the NCCUSL and ALI
cannot overrule courts that interpret UCC provisions in ways the drafters did not intend;
rather, the courts can only be overruled by higher courts within their own jurisdiction).
124. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative
Approach, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 721,728 (1994).
125. Id.
126. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Ramseyer, supra note 124, at 728 (describing the prevail-
ing federal rule as a "hands-off-the-courts rule").
127. See Ramseyer, supra note 124, at 728.
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justices are often elected,'2' and even if they are appointed by elected
officials, they are usually only appointed for limited terms.'29 They are
therefore usually subject to replacement, reappointment, or reelection on
a periodic basis. Most importantly of all, they are subject to reappoint-
ment or reelection by state officials or state voters, not by federal offi-
cials.3 In short, federal judges and Supreme Court Justices are com-
pletely beyond the control of the individual states' electorates; state
judges and justices are not.
Since federal court rulings on questions of state law cannot be appealed
to state courts, and since neither elected state officials nor the states'
electorates have any control over the appointment or reappointment of
federal judges, the federal courts actually have a wider range of discretion
over the interpretation of state law than the state courts.3 This is a phe-
nomenon associated with the exercise of the federal courts' diversity ju-
risdiction generally.32 In the field of commercial law, however, and espe-
cially the sub-field of sales law, the problem is much more acute. The
impossibility of a state court overruling a federal court's interpretation of
a state statute, and the difficulty of overruling federal interpretations of
sales statutes through the NCCUSL-ALI process, together with the ab-
sence of any check on federal judicial discretion through periodic reap-
pointment or renewal of federal judges, means that the federal courts
have almost unbridled discretion in their rulings on any questions arising
under Article 2.133 Whether their autonomy is unwholesome is a matter
open to debate. On the one hand, it creates the potential for an exercise
of judicial discretion that is inconsistent with modern notions of democ-
racy and judicial restraint. However, on the other hand, it allows the fed-
eral courts to militate against the legislative obsolescence that otherwise
tends to result from the strong bias in favor of the status quo that is in-
herent in the NCCUSL-ALI process.3
There is a trade-off implicit in the role that the federal courts currently
play in the development of commercial law. The wide discretion the fed-
eral courts enjoy in interpreting state commercial law statutes and their
128. See SUSAN P. FINO, THE ROLE OF STATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE NEW
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 20, 34 (1987).
129. Id. at 59.
130. Id. at 50.
131. See TARR & PORTER, supra note 14, at 19.
132. Id. As Tarr and Porter note, the federal courts remain important to the develop-
ment of state common law generally: "[B]ecause federal courts confront common law
issues, they contribute to the development of the common law, and state courts may draw
upon their rulings in enunciating common law principles." Id. at 20.
133. Of course, state courts are not bound by federal court rulings on questions of state
law, and, in theory, a state court could have an opportunity to correct an errant federal
ruling in a subsequent case. But in practice, this is unlikely. See supra note 22.
134. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 597.
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immunity from any oversight or control by the state electorate or elected
state officials clearly raises questions about the role of the federal judici-
ary. Yet, given the difficulty of revising Article 2 through the NCCUSL-
ALI process and the inertia that would otherwise leave modem sales law
in the grip of the status quo,35 the federal judiciary is also the most im-
portant source of innovation and experimentation in modem sales law.
36
It is clear that the most controversial interpretations of Article 2 within
the last several years have been rendered by federal courts. 37 In some
cases, federal courts appear to have consciously used their discretion in
attempts to fashion new rules in accord with evolving commercial prac-
tices and standards rather than simply interpreting the statutes as
drafted.18 Ironically, they appear to be acting out of similar motivations
to those federal courts in the nineteenth century that, under the authority
of Swift v. Tyson, disregarded state commercial law holdings and instead
appealed to the broader principles and imperatives of commerce in at-
tempts to fashion uniform rules of commercial law.'39
The peculiarities of the commercial lawmaking process in the United
States in conjunction with the American system of judicial federalism
thus place the federal courts in a unique and important position. In some
ways, the role they play is similar to the role of traditional common law
courts. While many might contend that this is undemocratic, some schol-
ars have argued that the common law process is not only more innovative
but ultimately more efficient than the statutory lawmaking process that
has largely replaced it.14° Whether the federal courts' exercise of their
discretion is for good or ill will ultimately depend on the consequences.
As the following discussion suggests, however, at this point, it has only
exacerbated the tendency toward contention and disunity in modern
American sales law. Moreover, in some cases, the exercise of judicial
discretion has been so bold that it challenges conventional notions about
the role of the judiciary and the scope of federal judicial powers.
135. Id.
136. See id.; supra note 134 and accompanying text.
137. See discussion infra Part III.
138. See discussion infra Part III.
139. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 404-05 (2d ed.
1977); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 65, 65 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 51,51 (1977).
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III. THE FEDERAL COURTS AND MODERN SALES LAW CONTROVERSIES
A. Computer Software and the Scope of the UCC
One of the stumbling blocks in recent efforts to amend Article 2 has
concerned its scope, specifically whether it should extend to transactions
in computer software and other forms of computer information.14 ' This
issue was the primary subject of a controversial ruling in 1991 by Judge
Weis of the Third Circuit in Advent Systems Ltd. v. Unisys Corp. 42 Ad-
143
vent involved two corporate parties, the named principals in the case.
Unisys contracted with Advent to provide the software and related hard-
ware for the document systems that Unisys was planning to sell with its
computers in the U.S. market.TM Under the terms of the contract, Advent
was also obligated to provide sales and marketing materials and assis-
tance with the construction and installation of the document systems.14'
The contract period was for two years with a provision for automatic re-
newal or termination by notice.' 46 Unisys, however, was restructuring
and, perhaps as a consequence, decided that it wanted to develop its own
document system.47 Unisys informed Advent that "their arrangement
had ended.' ' 48 Advent sued, alleging breach of contract.' 49
At trial, with the agreement of both parties, the court applied Pennsyl-
vania law. The trial judge decided that Pennsylvania common law
should apply to the contract rather than Article 2, and the jury found
Unisys liable for damages of over four million dollars for breach of con-
tract. 51 Unisys appealed, arguing that: (1) the trial judge erred in apply-
ing Pennsylvania common law rather than Article 2; (2) the contract was
not enforceable against Unisys under the statute of frauds provision in
UCC section 2-201 because the writing lacked a quantity term; and (3)
141. In the end, the drafters punted: The proposed revisions to Article 2 leave the
scope of Article 2 to case law. As the preliminary official comment to 2-103(k) states:
When a transaction involves both the sale of goods and the transfer of rights in infor-
mation, it is up to the courts to determine whether the transaction is entirely within or
outside of this article, or whether or to what extent this article should be applied to a
portion of the transaction.
U.C.C. § 2-103 (Proposed Official Comment 2003).
142. See Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 670 (3d Cir. 1991).







150. Id. at 673 n.1 (noting that the contract included a provision specifying that Penn-
sylvania law would apply).
151. Id. at 672.
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even if the contract was enforceable, it lacked sufficient definiteness upon
which to base a remedy. Under Pennsylvania common law, the statute
of frauds did not bar Advent from enforcing the contract, nor did Ad-
vent's claim fail for lack of a reasonably certain basis for providing a
remedy. The case thus turned on the trial judge's decision to apply the
common law.
Judge Weis began by invoking the predominant factor test, although he
did not explicitly refer to it as such.'- 4 He looked first to the language of
the writing, and noted that it began with a statement that described Uni-
sys' objective under the agreement as being to "purchase," and Advent's
objective as being to "sell" certain of Advent's hardware "products" and
software licenses for "resale."'5 5 Judge Weis noted that a subsequent
heading described the subject matter of the transaction as a "sale" and
that the section thereunder also used the words "buy" and "sell" and
"products" 
-words that are all generally indicative of a contract for the
sale of goods rather than a contract for services."' He noted that Advent
was supposed to invoice Unisys for each product purchased and for main-
tenance fees separately. 57 The charge for Advent's support services was
to be "3% per annum of the ... list price of each software module" sold
by Unisys. Some additional services were to be provided at no cost.5 9
The relatively small share of the charges for services was also indicative
of a sales contract'
This would have been enough for the court to rule that the contract was
one for the sale of goods rather than the supply of services, but Judge
Weis proceeded to render a holding about the nature of software gener-
ally.16' He characterized software as "the medium that stores input and
output data as well as computer programs" where the medium is in the
form of a hard disk, floppy disk, or magnetic tape.62 Judge Weis noted
the voluminous academic commentaries on the nature of software and
observed that most of it favored the view that software was a good within
the meaning of UCC section 2-102.163 Moreover, he noted that defining
152. Id.
153. Id. at 673-74.









163. Id. at 675-76. The Code is not particularly helpful. UCC section 2-102 states that
"this Article applies to transactions in goods," and UCC section 2-105(1) defines goods as
"all things ... which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale."
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software as a good would bring software transactions within the scope of
Article 2, and that this would serve to unify the body of law applied to
disputes arising from computer software transactions. " In his view, this
was a strong policy argument for including transactions in computer soft-
ware within the scope of Article 2.'6' He therefore went beyond simply
ruling that the contract in dispute was one for the sale of goods, holding
that "software is a 'good' within the definition in the Code."'66
It is far from obvious that Judge Weis was pleased with the implications
of this holding for the case at hand. The statute of frauds provision for
Article 2 in UCC section 2-201(1) clearly states that a "contract is not
enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in
such writing. ' 67 This was an impediment to Advent in seeking enforce-
ment of the contract because the writing executed between Advent and
Unisys had no quantity term.' 6 Of course, as Judge Weis noted, UCC
section 2-201(1) states only that a contract under Article 2 is not enforce-
able beyond the quantity shown, not that a quantity must be shown for a
contract to be enforceable. 169 Although the plausibility of this interpreta-
tion has been acknowledged by some commentators,17 it has not been
widely followed.' 7' Judge Weis therefore eschewed that approach in fa-
vor of another that drew an analogy between the contract between Ad-
U.C.C. §§ 2-102, 2-105(1) (2002). Computer software itself is intangible, but it is usually
encoded on some movable thing, such as a floppy disc or a computer hard drive. Judge
Weis may have been correct about the weight of the academic commentary at the time he
wrote his opinion, but the weight has probably shifted since then. See, e.g., Lorin Brennan,
Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38 DUo. L. REv. 459,464 (2000).
164. Advent, 925 F.2d at 676.
165. Id.
166. Id. It is not clear how broadly Judge Weis meant for this holding to apply. He
had earlier noted:
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual process, but once implanted
in a medium are widely distributed to computer owners....
That a computer program may be copyrightable as intellectual property does not
alter the fact that once in the form of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is
tangible, moveable and available at the marketplace.
Id. at 675. It is plausible to interpret Judge Weis' holding, therefore, to mean that com-
puter software is a good when it is encoded on some kind of computer disc or hardware.
Indeed, some federal district courts in the Third Circuit have adopted this interpretation.
See infra note 206.
167. U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (2002).
168. Advent, 925 F.2d at 676.
169. Id. at 677.
170. See JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §
19.34, at 760-63 (4th ed. 1998); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-4, at 48 n.11 (4th ed. 1995).
171. According to Judge Weis, "[c]ourts have generally found that a quantity term
must be stated." Advent, 925 F.2d at 677.
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vent and Unisys and an exclusive requirements contract. 7 1 Judge Weis
reasoned that, although the contract between Advent and Unisys was
nonexclusive, it was similar to an exclusive requirements contract in
many ways.'73 Since Article 2 does not require an output term in exclu-
sive requirements contracts,7 4 Judge Weis held that an output term was
not strictly required for Advent to enforce its contract with Unisys. 1
75
Judge Weis' reasoning on this point was tenuous at best. Although
UCC section 2-306 does not strictly require an output term in an exclu-
sive requirements contract, that is clearly because the buyer's require-
ments can be used as a good faith proxy.176 Indeed, UCC section 2-306(1)
states that "[a] term which measures the quantity by the output of the
seller or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or re-
quirements as may occur in good faith.' ' 177 The UCC thus makes it clear
that the good faith requirements of the buyer in an exclusive require-
ments contract are to be treated as equivalent to a specific output term.
Since the contract is for the buyer's exclusive requirements, there are no
other suppliers to which the buyer can turn, and the buyer's good faith
requirements are a reasonable proxy for a specific output term. The con-
tract between Advent and Unisys, however, was not an exclusive re-
quirements contract. 78 Therefore, Unisys' good faith requirements could
not have been a reliable proxy for the contract's output term because
Unisys was apparently free to satisfy its requirements from other suppli-
ers.179 Judge Weis' analogy between the contract in Advent and an exclu-
sive requirements contract stretches the scope of UCC section 2-306 well
beyond anything the drafters could have intended.
Judge Weis' analogy also evades the statute of frauds requirements in
UCC section 2-201.180 There is clearly some ambiguity about the wording
of UCC section 2-201(1). Nonetheless, the comments to UCC section 2-
201 indicate that section 2-201(1) was meant to imply that a quantity term
is required for a contract to be enforceable."' Official comment 1 notes:
"The only term which must appear is the quantity term which need not
be accurately stated but recovery is limited to the amount stated. 1 82 The
172. Id. at 678.
173. Id.
174. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (2002).
175. Advent, 925 F.2d at 679.
176. See U.C.C. § 2-306(1).
177. Id.
178. Advent, 925 F.2d at 678. As Judge Weis noted, "the parties arrived at a non-
exclusive requirements contract, a commercially useful device." Id.
179. See id.
180. U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
181. See id. § 2-201 cmt. 1.
182. Id,
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comments later provide: "Only three definite and invariable require-
ments as to the memorandum are made by this subsection.... [T]hird, it
must specify a quantity."'' 3 The buyer's good faith requirements in an
exclusive requirements contract are, by the express provisions of UCC
section 2-306(),184 sufficient to satisfy the output requirement in UCC
section 2-201(1). 18 But there is no statutory basis for holding that the
buyer's good faith output in a nonexclusive requirements contract is suf-
ficient to satisfy the output requirement. Judge Weis' opinion is not con-
sistent with a plain reading of the Code.
Advent Systems faced yet another hurdle in its attempt to recover from
Unisys in UCC section 2-204(3).' 86 UCC section 2-204(3) states that a
contract "does not fail for indefiniteness" even though one or more terms
are left open "if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is
a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy."'' This sug-
gests that a contract does fail if there is not a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy. With no output term in the contract, Ad-
vent could not easily prove its damages.' 8' Judge Weis did not attempt to
resolve the matter; instead, he remanded the case to the lower court for a
determination as to whether the contract provided a reasonably certain
basis for calculating Advent's damages. 189 He did, however, frame the
inquiry for the trial court by suggesting that a sound basis for calculating
damages might be found by estimating what Unisys' good faith output
requirements would have been.' 9° Here again, Judge Weis drew on an
analogy to an exclusive requirements contract. As official comment 2 to
UCC section 2-306 states, "[u]nder this Article, a contract for output or
requirements is not too indefinite since it is held to mean the actual good
faith output or requirements of the particular party." '191
The problem with this analogy, once again, is that the contract between
Advent and Unisys was not an exclusive requirements contract. Hence,
Unisys' good faith output requirements could not serve as a reliable
proxy for an output term and they did not provide a reasonably certain
basis for calculating Advent's damages.' 92 One cannot help but suspect
that Judge Weis pointed the district court in this direction to avoid the
183. Id.
184. Id. § 2-306(1).
185. Id. § 2-201(1).
186. Id. § 2-204(3).
187. Id.
188. Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670,680-81 (3d Cir. 1991).
189. Id. at 680.
190. Id. at 680-81.
191. U.C.C. § 2-306 cmt. 2.
192. See Advent, 925 F.2d at 680-82.
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potentially harsh consequences for Advent of his holding that the con-
tract was for the sale of goods rather than services.
Advent had been awarded damages at trial in a contest that was adju-
dicated under Pennsylvania common law. 93 Judge Weis overturned the
trial court and held that Article 2 applied to the case and indeed would
apply to any case in which computer software was the predominant factor
in the contract.194 Yet Judge Weis' sympathies clearly lay with Advent.
Unisys reneged on the deal and Advent was left in the lurch.1 95 There is
little doubt that Advent lost the benefit of a bargain. However, by hold-
ing that Article 2 applied to the case rather than the common law, Judge
Weis exposed Advent to a potential bar to its enforcement of the con-
tract by the statute of frauds.' 9' Judge Weis' creative interpretation of
UCC section 2-201(1) prevented Advent from facing a strict bar to en-
forcement, but Advent was still exposed to the risk that its suit would fail
for lack of a reasonably certain basis for providing a remedy. Judge Weis
nonetheless suggested to the trial court (and Advent) how the contract
might be construed to provide a reasonably certain basis for calculating a
remedy, by drawing on the good faith requirement.1'9 By all appearances,
Judge Weis went to great lengths to help Advent out of the bind in which
he put them by deciding the case under Article 2 instead of the common
law.
As Judge Weis made clear, his decision to apply Article 2 was driven by
utilitarian calculations!" 8 Indeed, his calculations had less to do with the
case at hand than with the scope of Article 2 generally. He could easily
have decided that, under the predominant factor test, the contract be-
tween Advent and Unysis was primarily for services rather than goods
and upheld the district court. He also could have held that the contract
was primarily for goods and applied Article 2 without rendering an opin-
ion about the nature of computer software in general. However, it would
have been difficult for Judge Weis to hold that computer software is a
193. Id. at 672.
194. Id. at 675-76.
195. Id. at 672.
196. Id. at 673-76.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 676. Judge Weis wrote:
Applying the U.C.C. to computer software transactions offers substantial benefits
to litigants and the courts. The Code offers a uniform body of law on a wide range of
questions likely to arise in computer software disputes: implied warranties, conse-
quential damages, disclaimers of liability, and the statute of limitations, to name a
few.
The importance of software to the commercial world and the advantages to be
gained by the uniformity inherent in the U.C.C. are strong policy arguments favoring
inclusion.
Id.
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good and that the contract between Advent and Unisys was primarily one
for services. Since Judge Weis clearly wanted to extend the scope of Ar-
ticle 2 to computer software, he was forced to apply Article 2 to the con-
tract. Because his sympathies in the case appeared to lie with Advent, he
also fashioned an unusual justification for excluding the effect of the stat-
ute of frauds, and even suggested how the district court might construe a
reasonable basis for calculating Advent's damages in the absence of any
reliable proxy for an output term.199
It is debatable whether Judge Weis should have brought transactions in
computer software within the scope of Article 2. In spite of Judge Weis'
utilitarian calculations, some commentators believe Article 2 is ill-suited
to transactions in computer information.20 For one thing, transactions in
computer information usually only involve the transfer of a license, not a
fee simple absolute.' 1 This makes the warranty provisions of Article 2
somewhat inappropriate.m Indeed, the NCCUSL approved the Uniform
Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) in 1999 specifically
for transactions involving the transfer of rights in computer informa-
tion.203 Although UCITA has not been widely adopted,204 it only exists
because there was a widespread view that neither the common law nor
Article 2 provides adequate governance mechanisms for computer in-
formation transactions. °s At this point, Judge Weis' holding in Advent
has not been widely followed,2°6 but if it is, it may simply force computer
information transactions into a legal box that does not fit.
199. Id. at 679-81.
200. See Brennan, supra note 163, at 464.
201. CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL 23 (rev. ed. 2002).
202. Id.
203. Brennan, supra note 163, at 461-62.
204. See Unif. Law Comm'rs, Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, A
Few Facts About the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, http://www.nccusl.
org/update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2007) (in-
dicating that the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act has only been adopted
by Maryland and Virginia).
205. See John M. Norwood, A Summary of Statutory and Case Law Associated with
Contracting in the Electronic Universe, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 415,415 (2006).
206. But see Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc. 148 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th
Cir. 1998) (following the rule provided in Advent); Smart Online, Inc. v. Opensite Techs.,
Inc., No. 01-CVS-09604, 2003 WL 21555316, at *3 (N.C. Super. Ct. June 17, 2003) (citing
the Advent rule favorably, but not strictly following it). Advent has been distinguished,
however, in a number of cases, including some heard in federal district courts in the Third
Circuit. See, e.g., Honeywell, Inc. v. Minolta Camera Co., Nos. CIV.A.87-4847, CIV.A.88-
2624, 1991 WL 841033, at *34 (D.N.J. July 19, 1991); Triple Point Tech., Inc. v. D.N.L.
Risk Management, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-4888WHW, 2000 WL 1236227, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Apr.
11, 2000), clarified, 2000 WL 1678033 (D.N.J. May 23,2000).
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B. Hill v. Gateway and the Rolling Contracts Controversy
Few commercial law cases have raised as much controversy as Judge
Easterbrook's opinion in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.207 The case involved
two consumers, Rich and Enza Hill, who ordered a personal computer
from Gateway over the telephone.2' At the time of the telephone order,
the Hills apparently were not given notice of any special contract terms
or otherwise informed that the manner of contracting would differ from
the norm in any way.2 9 The Hills' computer arrived in a box, which in-
cluded a writing purporting to list additional contract terms. ° One of the
terms was an arbitration clause, which obliged the Hills to resolve any
disputes by arbitration if they retained possession of the computer for
more than thirty days.21' The Hills retained the computer for more than
thirty days before complaining about some of its components and its per-
formance.1 Gateway was unable or unwilling to address their com-
plaints to their satisfaction, and thus they filed suit in federal district
court asserting claims under Illinois sales law. 3
At trial, Gateway asked the district judge to enforce the arbitration
clause and dismiss the suit.214 The judge refused, and Gateway initiated
an interlocutory appeal under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A).2 5 The case thus
came before Judge Easterbrook on the question of the validity of the
arbitration clause. 6 Easterbrook vacated the district court's decision and
remanded the case with instructions to compel the Hills to submit their
case to arbitration. 7 His disposition of the question has not only pro-
vided an important precedent for other courts to consider but has also
initiated an ongoing debate about the merits of a new theory of contract
formation-the theory of "rolling contracts., 21 1 Judge Easterbrook's
opinion has been widely criticized, and for a variety of reasons. But
many of the criticisms have been so obvious that Judge Easterbrook must
have anticipated them. Because of that, and because of the great esteem
207. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).









217. Id. at 1151.
218. See generally Roger C. Bern, "Terms Later" Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad
Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. &
POL'Y 641 (2004); Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 679 (2004); William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over Contract Law,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1099 (2004).
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in which Judge Easterbrook is held, Hill v. Gateway deserves a careful
analysis, and Judge Easterbrook's reasoning should be accorded consid-
erable respect.
Judge Easterbrook essentially followed ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg.219
In ProCD, the Seventh Circuit held that under Illinois law a customer
who bought software on a CD contained in a box was bound by contract
terms inside the box after the customer had an opportunity to read the
terms and reject them by returning the software.20 The Hills attempted
to distinguish their case from ProCD to no avail. They first argued that
ProCD should be limited to software.22 Judge Easterbrook was not con-
vinced. As he put it, "ProCD is about the law of contract, not the law of
software."' Next, the Hills argued that ProCD was an executory con-
tract and its precedential effect should be limited to executory con-
tracts.2 Judge Easterbrook correctly observed, however, that the con-
tract in ProCD was no more executory than the contract between the
224Hills and Gateway. In fact, sales contracts are usually executory for at
least some time, since there are usually warranties that extend for a con-
siderable duration.m
At oral argument, the Hills noted that in ProCD the software packag-
ing included writing on the exterior that provided notice of additional
terms inside.226 Thus, since the software was sold through retail stores,
any customer who purchased it should have had notice of the additional
terms before making the purchase.227 The box containing Gateway's com-
puter did not provide such notice.m Judge Easterbrook attributed the
distinction to the differences in the functionality of the boxes in the two
cases: one was for display, whereas the other was only for delivery. He
thus implied that the writing on the box was irrelevant.2 Finally, the
Hills argued that they were consumers, whereas the customer in ProCD,
Zeidenberg, was a merchant.31 Thus, they argued that the additional
terms inside the software packaging became part of Zeidenberg's con-
tract with ProCD under UCC section 2-207(2), whereas in their case, the
additional terms inside the box containing the computer did not become
219. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
220. Id. at 1452.




225. See id. at 1149-50.
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part of their contract with Gateway.2 Judge Easterbrook dismissed the
argument as inapt: "The question in ProCD was not whether terms were
added to a contract after its formation, but how and when the contract
was formed ....,233
Judge Easterbrook construed the case as one about the time of the
formation of the contract. Since the Seventh Circuit had already ad-
dressed a similar question in ProCD, and since Judge Easterbrook
viewed ProCD as a controlling case, there was little need for further con-
sideration of the Hills' claim.34 Nonetheless, in dicta, Judge Easterbrook
elaborated on the policy rationale for his holding.35 In his view, the Hills
must have known that important contract terms would be included in the
packaging when they ordered their computer.3 6 He noted that Gateway's
ads stated that their computers came with a limited warranty and lifetime
support23 7 Presumably, the Hills must have known that the precise terms
of the warranty would be provided inside the packaging of their com-
puter upon the computer's delivery. By implication, they should have
known that other important contract terms might also be included inside
the packaging.
Judge Easterbrook noted that the law provides consumers with three
principal ways of learning the specific terms of their contracts: First,
they can ask the vendor to provide the specific terms before making their
purchase.239 Thus, the Hills could have requested the information before
making their telephone order. Second, consumers can avail themselves
of the vast amount of information available from public sources, such as
vendors' websites or consumer publications.24° The Hills presumably
could have found out about the arbitration clause merely by doing a little
research before their purchase. Finally, consumers can read the informa-
tion that vendors place inside the packaging of their products, including
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See id. at 1148-49. Reliance on ProCD was highly controversial for a number of
reasons. ProCD was not a simple sales case, since it involved computer software. As the
preceding discussion of Advent suggests, the appropriate choice of law for contractual
disputes involving computer software remains highly contentious. See discussion supra
Part III.A. Moreover, since many commentators believe ProCD applied Article 2 incor-
rectly, it is hardly persuasive under the similar facts of Hill v. Gateway. See sources cited
supra note 218. Finally, the dispute in ProCD did not arise from a telephone order, and
thus, UCC section 2-206(1)(b) did not apply. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
1450 (7th Cir. 1996); U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b) (2002).
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any information about the precise contract terms.241 The Hills clearly had
an opportunity to do so. Judge Easterbrook suggested that, by keeping
the computer for more than thirty days, they impliedly accepted the con-
tract arbitration clause. 22
Judge Easterbrook implied that any inconvenience to consumers
caused by the burden of having to research the terms of their contracts is
outweighed by the practical advantages of allowing vendors to include
contract terms in the packaging of their products.243 Indeed, in his view, it
would be highly impractical to expect all vendors to provide complete
information about all contract terms prior to their customers' purchases.
He explained:
Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to custom-
ers before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the
phone for direct-sales operations such as Gateway's had to read
the four-page statement of terms before taking the buyer's credit
card number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than
enlighten many potential buyers. Others would hang up in a rage
over the waste of their time. And oral recitation would not avoid
customers' assertions ... that the clerk did not read term X to
them .... 244
As one would expect, Judge Easterbrook's reasoning is compelling.
Some have doubted, however, whether the practical difficulties of provid-
ing customers with information prior to their purchases are as great as
Judge Easterbrook claims.25 According to Honnold and Reitz, for in-
stance, there is no practical difficulty for sellers in "disclosing, or at least
outlining, rights-negating terms at the point of sale ... whether by tele-
phone, email, or in-store." 24' But Judge Easterbrook seems to have a
point. First of all, it is not at all clear whether a seller would provide suf-
ficient information to satisfy the formalities of contract by merely outlin-
ing right-negating terms. Second, it is not even clear whether basic in-
formation about complex contract terms can be adequately communi-
cated via telephone. Customers may not be able to comprehend signifi-
cant amounts of information about complex contract terms communi-
cated over the telephone. Indeed, attempts to contract around the usual
contract rules in such a manner might well be considered unconscion-
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1149.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Bern, supra note 218, at 697-98.
246. JOHN 0. HONNOLD & CURTIS R. REITZ, SALES TRANSACTIONS: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL LAw 248 (3d ed. 2006).
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able.247 And finally, telephone orders in particular raise difficult eviden-
tiary problems.24 It is not clear how the seller could prove that every
customer always received all the information. Even if all telephone or-
ders were recorded, it would still be difficult to prove that the customer
correctly heard every contract term. Moreover, compelling sellers to
record every telephone order and establish a suitable system for storing
and retrieving the recordings would require considerable expense.
Nonetheless, on its face, Hill v. Gateway appears to misapply the UCC.
This is ironic because Article 2 is quite liberal in general about the forma-
tion of contracts. UCC section 2-204(1) states that a contract may be
made in "any manner sufficient to show agreement."2 49 The official
comment explains that this continues the policy of recognizing any man-
ner of expression- oral, written, or other-as sufficient to form a con-
tract, subject, of course, to other rules governing the legal effect of such
expressions, including the parol evidence rule.2 '0 Even the parties' con-
duct can be sufficient to form a contract if it is construed as recognizing
the existence of an agreement.' Indeed, UCC section 2-204(2) states
that a contract may be formed even though the "moment of its making is
undetermined. ''252 As the official comment explains, this recognizes that
the interactions of the parties might be sufficient to form a contract with-
out clearly indicating the precise point at which the formation occurred."
UCC section 2-206(1)(a) complements UCC section 2-204 by obliging
courts to construe offers as inviting acceptance "in any manner and by
any medium reasonable in the circumstances" unless otherwise "unambi-
guously indicated. ' ,214 As the official comments elaborate, "[t]his section
is intended to remain flexible and its applicability to be enlarged as new
media of communication develop or as the more time-saving present day
media come into general use. '' "
UCC sections 2-204(1), 2-204(2), and 2-206(1)(a), by themselves, thus
appear to provide a statutory basis for Judge Easterbrook's Hill v. Gate-
way holding. Under UCC section 2-204(1), a court could construe Gate-
way's delivery of the computer, complete with the terms on the writings
inside the packaging, as an offer. Under UCC section 2-206(1)(a), Gate-
247. See generally U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2002) ("If the court ... finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may
refuse to enforce the contract .....
248. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149.
249. U.C.C. § 2-204(1).
250. Id. § 2-204 cmt.
251. Id.
252. Id. § 2-204(2).
253. Id. § 2-204 cmt.
254. Id. § 2-206(1).
255. Id. § 2-206 cmt. 1.
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way's thirty-day window for rejecting the terms by returning the com-
puter could be construed as inviting acceptance through the Hills' con-
duct-the failure to return the computer within the time specified in
Gateway's offer. This would be consonant with the policy stated in the
official comment to UCC section 2-206 of extending the UCC's flexible
formation rules to a present day medium-the telephone-as it comes
into more general commercial use.256 Indeed, even if Gateway had not
provided a thirty-day window for returning the computer, under UCC
sections 2-204(2) and 2-206(1)(a), a court might have construed the Hills'
decision not to return the computer within a reasonable time as accep-
tance, even though the precise time of formation might have been inde-
terminable.
But UCC sections 2-204(1), 2-204(2), and 2-206(1)(a) do not stand by
themselves. Although Article 2 is generally quite liberal about the for-
mation of contracts, it provides a specific rule where a party makes a
telephone order-or, indeed, makes an order to buy goods of any kind.
5 7
UCC section 2-206(1) states: "Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated
... an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment
shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to
ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or non-
conforming goods .... ,, 8 On its face, this appears to oblige courts to
construe a telephone order, such as the one made by the Hills, as an offer
to buy goods. The offer should presumably be construed as one to buy
goods subject to the usual rules of commercial contracting under Article
2, unless it is made in such a way as to clearly modify them. Thus, one
should presume that the buyer intends to retain all of her rights under the
warranty of title in UCC section 2-312 and the warranties of quality in
UCC sections 2-313, 2-314, and 2-315, as well as all of her rights to reme-
dies for breaches of those warranties elsewhere in Article 2, unless she
indicates otherwise in making her order.259 The seller's prompt or current
shipment of the goods must be construed as an acceptance of the buyer's
offer, and unless the seller unambiguously indicates otherwise, the buyer
is entitled to all of the usual warranties and remedies available under
Article 2.2°
Nonetheless, a seller is not compelled to accept all of the usual rules
governing the buyer's rights and remedies. As UCC section 2-206(1)(b)
explains, "shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute an ac-
ceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the shipment is
256. See id.
257. Id. § 2-206(1)(b).
258. Id.
259. See id. §§ 2-206(1)(b), 2-312 to -315, 2-714 to -715.
260. See id. § 2-206(1).
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offered only as an accommodation to the buyer."26' It is not entirely clear
what this means, but the wording suggests that the seller can contract
around the buyer's usual rights and remedies. UCC section 2-106(2) de-
fines conforming goods as those "in accordance with the obligations un-
der the contract., 262 Nonconforming goods are thus presumably goods
that are not in accordance with the seller's obligations under the contract.
But section 2-206(1)(b) states that if the seller seasonably notifies the
buyer that the shipment is only an accommodation to the buyer, the
seller's shipment of nonconforming goods does not constitute an accep-
tance."" If it does not constitute an acceptance, there is no contract to
which the goods can conform, and this part of UCC section 2-206 makes
little sense.6 The reference to "the shipment of non-conforming goods"
in UCC section 2-206(1)(b) is thus best understood as meaning a ship-
ment that is not in accordance with the seller's obligations under the
265terms of the buyer's offer. In a typical telephone order, the terms of
the buyer's offer would normally include all of the default rules of Article
2. If the seller notified the buyer that the shipment was only an accom-
modation, however, and not an acceptance, the formation of the contract
would be delayed.266 The seller could include writings with the shipment
of goods that defined the terms of an offer; the buyer's conduct (such as
retaining possession of the goods for more than thirty days) could then
constitute an acceptance of the offer.
Indeed, even if the seller did not explicitly contract around the usual
default rules of Article 2 in this manner, there is a qualification placed on
both parts (a) and (b) of UCC section 2-206(1): "Unless otherwise unam-
biguously indicated by the language or circumstances .... ,,267 These
qualifying words provide the strongest rationale available under Article 2
for Judge Easterbrook's Hill v. Gateway holding, although ironically it is
not a rationale that Judge Easterbrook himself explicitly stated.26 8 They
imply that if the circumstances of a telephone order unambiguously indi-
.cate that the seller's shipment of goods does not operate as an acceptance
of the buyer's offer, UCC section 2-206(1)(b) is inapplicable. 269 Although
Judge Easterbrook did not explicitly develop this line of reasoning, his
opinion leaves little doubt that he believes consumers who make tele-
phone orders usually understand that the seller may include additional
261. Id. § 2-206(1)(b).
262. Id. § 2-106(2).
263. Id. § 2-206(1)(b).
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. § 2-206(1)(b).
267. Id. § 2-206(1).
268. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
269. See U.C.C. § 2-206(1).
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contract terms in the packaging, and that the seller's shipment of the
goods does not therefore constitute an acceptance of the buyer's offer.270
Whether the circumstances of a telephone order "unambiguously indi-
cate" that the seller's shipment of the goods does not operate as an ac-
ceptance is another matter. Most of Judge Easterbrook's critics pre-
sumably believe there is sufficient ambiguity to make the qualification
inapplicable. 27'
If this qualification to UCC section 2-206(1)(b) does not apply, the con-
tract was formed when Gateway shipped the computer and it did not in-
clude the terms that Gateway included inside the packaging, such as thearbiratin " 272
arbitration clause. Under Article 2, these were additional terms in an
acceptance, subject to UCC section 2-207.273 UCC section 2-207 provides
two rules for such situations: the "last shot" rule in UCC section 2-207(2)
and the "knock out" rule in UCC section 2-207(3).274 This has created
some confusion and controversy about when the particular rules are
meant to apply. Official comment 1 explains that UCC section 2-207 is
meant to apply in two situations: first, when an agreement has been
reached but one or both parties send memoranda that include terms in
addition to those agreed upon; second, when the parties do not clearly
reach an agreement on any terms but agree to transact, and then ex-
change memoranda-or "acknowledgements" -that contain different
terms. 27' The classic scenario for the second situation is the one in which
the parties exchange standard forms. 276 According to official comment 2,
the last shot rule of UCC section 2-207(2) applies to the first situation, in
which an agreement has been closed; by implication, the knock out rule
of section 2-207(3) applies to situations in which an agreement on terms
has not been reached, such as in the case of an exchange of standard
forms.
27 7
Setting Judge Easterbrook's holding aside, and supposing instead that
Article 2 as construed here applies, it is not precisely clear which of the
270. Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150 ("[T]he Hills knew before they ordered the computer that
the carton would include some important terms .....
271. See, e.g., Bern, supra note 218, at 692-94.
272. See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b).
273. See id. § 2-207.
274. Id. Under the last shot rule, in a contract between merchants, additional terms are
automatically added to the contract unless "the offer expressly limits [the terms of] accep-
tance to the terms of the offer," "they materially alter" the contract, or "notification of
objection to them has already been given or is given within a reasonable time." Id. § 2-
207(2). Under the knock out rule, "the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree," plus any additional terms implied by
Article 2. Id. § 2-207(3); see also GILLETrE & WALT, supra note 201, at 69-76.
275. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1.
276. Id.
277. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 2.
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two rules should apply in the Hill v. Gateway situation. The parties did
not dicker or negotiate over the terms of their agreement, but a contract
appears to have been formed nonetheless under UCC section 2-
206(1)(b).278 Since the parties did not exchange standard forms, the case
for applying the last shot rule may seem the strongest. Nonetheless, offi-
cial comment 7 states: "In many cases, as where goods are shipped, ac-
cepted and paid for before any dispute arises, there is no question
whether a contract has been made .... The only question is what terms
are included .... 279 According to official comment 7, in such a case, the
knock out rule "furnishes the governing rule." Regardless of which
rule applies, however, the outcome would appear to favor the Hills.
Under the last shot rule, the terms of their agreement were defined at
the time Gateway shipped the computer. The contract included all of the
default rules of Article 2, since the parties did not agree to any special
contract terms of their own.8 Under UCC section 2-207(2), the terms on
the writings inside the box should have been construed as proposals for
addition to the contractfm Section 2-207(2) states that between mer-
chants, such proposals automatically become part of the contract unless
"the offer expressly limits [the terms of] acceptance to the terms of the
offer," "they materially alter it," or the party receiving them gives notice
of objection to them within a reasonable time.s The Hills were clearly
consumers, not merchants.8 UCC section 2-207(2) does not state any
conditions under which the proposed additional terms become part of the
contract if the recipient is not a merchant.m They presumably do not
become part of the contract without the recipient's consent. Since the
Hills did not consent to any of the additional terms, including the arbitra-
tion clause, the additional terms could not have become part of the con-
tract.
Under the knock out rule of UCC section 2-207(3), the contract would
include all those terms on which the writings of the parties agreed, plus
any supplemental terms included under other provisions of Article 2.2
Since the Hills did not provide a writing, none of the terms in Gateway's
writings could have been included in the contract unless they would also
278. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997).
279. U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 7.
280. Id.
281. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148; see also supra text accompanying note 278.
282. U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
283. Id.
284. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148. UCC section 2-104(1) defines a merchant as "a person
who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." U.C.C. §
2-104(1).
285. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2).
286. Id. § 2-207(3).
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have been included by other provisions of Article 2. Since none of the
other provisions of Article 2 would have implied an arbitration clause,
the arbitration clause clearly could not have become part of the contract
under the knock out rule. It is also doubtful whether any of the other
terms in Gateway's writings could have become part of the contract
unless the Hills agreed to them. Absent the Hills' agreement, the terms
of the contract could only have been those provided by the default rules
of Article 2. 7
Judge Easterbrook has been widely criticized by scholars who argue
that he did not follow the UCC.m Indeed, there seems little doubt that
his ruling was motivated primarily by policy considerations, and that he
relied on the ProCD precedent to circumvent the implications of Article
2.m This is regrettable because it has only confounded the effect of his
ruling and compromised his objective, which appears to have been to
resolve the conundrum raised by "terms later" contracts for the sale of
goods.2 ° Judge Easterbrook clearly felt that utilitarian considerations
favored a change in the rules, and there is good reason to believe he is
right (although these are not the only considerations).291 Requiring sell-
ers to provide notice of the additional terms at the time of buyers' tele-
phone orders would raise significant evidentiary problems. 29 How would
sellers prove that sufficient notice was given in every telephone order?
Would every telephone order have to be recorded and stored until the
statute of limitations on any potential cause of action expired? Would
such recordings be admissible?
In spite of all the criticisms of Judge Easterbrook's opinion, it is not
clear that adhering to a strict interpretation of UCC section 2-206(1)(b)
will ultimately prove to be in the best interests of consumers. Forcing
sellers to jump through hoops to contract around Article 2's default rules
or to simply forego arbitration clauses and other contractual arrange-
ments that reduce their expected legal costs will result in higher prices for
goods purchased through telephone orders. We can only speculate, but it
seems reasonable to conjecture that most consumers, if given the choice,
would probably opt to subject themselves to arbitration clauses and other
reasonable limitations on their contract rights if it meant obtaining the
287. See id.
288. See, e.g., Bern, supra note 218, at 641-43; Lawrence, supra note 218, at 1101.
289. See Bern, supra note 218, at 662-63.
290. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (implying
"terms later" contracts apply in many commercial contexts). As Easterbrook noted in his
opinion, "terms later" agreements are quite common in contracts for services. See id. at
1149 ("Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transportation,
insurance, and many other endeavors.").
291. See Bern, supra note 218, at 712-14.
292. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
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goods for lower prices. After all, how many manufacturers offer "full
warranties" under the Magnusson-Moss Warranty Act because consum-
ers prefer them to limited warranties?29 How many consumers in general
decline to make purchases because they object to limited warranties and
arbitration clauses? 294 There is no systematic evidence, but casual obser-
vation suggests that most consumers are not willing to pay much for con-
tract rights with uncertain or unknown values. Of course, this may reflect
the limits on their rationality, and to the extent that it does, consumer
protections of some kind could be necessary to vindicate their rights and
enhance the public welfare. But those protections could take some form
other than cumbrous constraints on sellers' efforts to service telephone
orders.295
The real problem with Hill v. Gateway seems to arise not from the rule
that Judge Easterbrook fashioned but from the cavalier way in which it
dispenses with some of the values that are deeply embedded in modern
contract law. Most scholars and other commentators probably would not
object to a delay in the timing of contract formation if consumers were
made aware that additional terms to which they had not already explicitly
assented would be added to their contracts unless they returned the
goods within some reasonable time.296 Indeed, some other courts have
rejected arbitration clauses that sellers included on writings inside the
packaging of their goods on the grounds that consumers had not assented
to the terms.297 Judge Easterbrook seems to believe that consumers
commonly understand that important contract terms are included in writ-
ings on or inside the packaging of goods;298 other scholars seem to dis-
agree.' 9 The question could be resolved through an empirical study, but
that would probably be beside the point. The real issue is whether con-
sumers need to be protected from inadvertently waiving their Article 2
rights.
293. HONNOLD & REITZ, supra note 246, at 289 ("The hope that most manufacturers
of consumer durable goods would offer full warranties has proven to be unfounded." (em-
phasis omitted)).
294. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 204-05 (2006) (discussing consumers' "optimism bias" and various legal strate-
gies for addressing the problems it raises).
295. See id. at 206-25 (noting alternative approaches to consumer protection).
296. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 743, 755
(2002) (arguing that the fair substance and fair presentation of terms, and not the time of
formation, should dictate enforceability).
297. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573-75 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998) (holding Gateway's arbitration clause to be unconscionable); Defontes v. Dell Com-
puters Corp., No. C.A. PC 03-2636, 2004 WL 253560, at *7 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2004)
(holding Dell's arbitration clause unenforceable because the buyer had not assented to it).
298. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997); Bern, supra
note 218, at 698-700.
299. See, e.g., Bern, supra note 218, at 698-700.
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Setting the controversy over the merits of his ruling aside, Judge
Easterbrook clearly sought to revise the law with his holding. His efforts
have been, at best, a mixed success. Although Hill v. Gateway has been
followed in some cases,3°° it has been rejected in others.3n 1 As things
stand, the law governing the matter in most jurisdictions is uncertain.
The uncertainty arises not because Article 2 is unclear, or because state
courts have independently shown an inclination to modify the law
through liberal interpretations. Rather, it is unclear because the Seventh
Circuit, in a conscious attempt to revise the law, has provided a contro-
versial ruling on a question of state law where the state law was perfectly
clear.
C. Failures of Limited Remedies and Exclusions of Consequential
Damages
Most sophisticated manufacturers attempt to limit their liabilities for
breach of both express and implied warranties.3°2 The UCC regulates
sellers' attempts to exclude or modify express and implied warranties in
section 2-316.303 It also regulates their attempts to exclude or limit dam-
ages in section 2-719.' °4 Most sophisticated manufacturers attempt to
make as few express warranties as they can 305 and to exclude all implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness.3 They also commonly avail
themselves of the provisions of UCC section 2-719(1) to offer a limited
remedy to repair or replace the goods in substitution for the remedies of
300. See, e.g., Filias v. Gateway 2000, Inc., No. 2:96-CV-75722 LPZ, 1997 WL 33814599,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 1997); Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
301. See Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1339 (D. Kan. 2000); Defontes,
2004 WL 253560, at *7.
302. HONNOLD & REITZ, supra note 246, at 219-20.
303. UCC section 2-316(1) precludes sellers from excluding express warranties once
made ("negation or limitation is inoperative" to the extent that it cannot reasonably be
interpreted as consistent with the wording or conduct by which express warranties were
created), and UCC section 2-316(2) states that "to exclude or modify the implied warranty
of merchantability ... the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclu-
sion must be by a writing and conspicuous." U.C.C. § 2-316(1)-(2) (2002).
304. See id. § 2-719(2) ("Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act."). As official
comment 1 to section 2-719 explains, "under subsection (2), where an apparently fair and
reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or operates to deprive ei-
ther party of the substantial value of the bargain, it must give way to the general remedy
provisions of this Article." Id. § 2-719 cmt. 1.
305. Of course, manufacturers act consistent with their marketing objectives for their
products. Once made, express warranties cannot be disclaimed. See id. § 2-316(1). Thus,
it behooves sellers to avoid making any superfluous warranties.
306. This is usually done in language that complies with UCC section 2-316(2), al-
though section 2-316(3) provides some useful alternatives. See id. § 2-316(2)-(3).
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the UCC.) In addition, to the extent that they can, they also typically
exclude all consequential damages3 8
This has created some confusion. Courts have struggled over the ap-
propriate interpretation of Article 2 where sellers' attempts to limit their
buyers' remedies fail to satisfy the regulatory provisions of UCC section
2-719.3 According to UCC section 2-719(2), when a limited remedy fails
of its essential purpose, the buyer has recourse to all of the default reme-
dies under Article 2.3"0 Of course, these remedies include expectation
damages under UCC section 2-71431' as well as incidental and consequen-
tial damages under UCC section 2-715.' But UCC section 2-719 also
allows sellers to exclude or limit a buyer's right to consequential dam-
ages.3 The only regulations on the seller's right to exclude consequential
damages are that the exclusion may not be unconscionable,314 and that
consequential damages may not be excluded or limited for personal in-
jury in the case where the buyer is a consumer.315 Where the buyer is a
merchant, therefore, the only regulation is that the exclusion may not be
unconscionable, and since courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine of
unconscionability when invoked by a merchant,316 Article 2 effectively
307. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a) (allowing a limited remedy clause "in addition to or in substi-
tution" for the default remedies under Article 2); id. § 2-719(1)(b) (presuming that the
limited remedy is "optional unless ... expressly agreed to be exclusive"). Needless to say,
most sophisticated manufacturers include wording in the writings to ensure that the limited
remedies will be exclusive.
308. Id. § 2-719(3) (allowing the limitation or exclusion of consequential damages
unless "the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable").
309. See GILLETIE & WALT, supra note 201, at 387-89.
310. U.C.C. § 2-719(2). As suggested in official comment 1, the test is whether the
limited remedy "fails in its purpose or operates to deprive either party of the substantial
value of the bargain." Id. § 2-719 cmt. 1.
311. Id. § 2-714(2) ("The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the difference
at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods accepted and the value
they would have had if they had been as warranted .. "). While the interpretation is not
transparent, this apparently includes damages applicable under the conventional doctrine
of expectancy or expectation damages. See GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 201, at 349-54.
312. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (authorizing incidental damages); id. § 2-715(2) (authorizing
consequential damages).
313. Id. § 2-719(3).
314. Id. Of course, since the doctrine of unconscionability seems to apply to all con-
tract clauses under section 2-302, this additional prohibition in section 2-719 may be re-
dundant. See id. § 2-302.
315. Id. § 2-719(3) ("Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in
the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable .... ).
316. The doctrine of unconscionability is usually applied through a two-prong test: the
first prong inquires as to whether there was any procedural abuse, and the second prong
examines whether there was any substantive abuse. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000,
Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998). The procedural abuse prong looks for a
variety of indicia, including whether there was any disparity in the bargaining capacities of
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places very little constraint on sellers' ability to exclude consequential
damages. Confusion arises, however, when sellers' limited remedies fail
of their essential purpose and the seller has also sought to exclude conse-
quential damages in a separate and distinct contract clause.
Does the provision in UCC section 2-719(2), which provides the buyer
with recourse to all the default remedies in Article 2, trump the addi-
tional clause purporting to exclude consequential damages, or does the
exclusion of the consequential damages clause stand independently of
whether the limitation of remedy fails? Early case law held that the fail-
ure of the limitation of remedy nullified the seller's attempt to exclude
consequential damages. 17 This was not a particularly convincing inter-
pretation. If the seller's limitation of remedy does not fail of its essential
purpose, then that by itself will be sufficient to deny the buyer any conse-
quential damages.318 Whether the contract includes an additional clause
purporting to exclude consequential damages will be irrelevant. If the
failure of the seller's limitation of remedy clause nullifies the seller's at-
tempt to exclude consequential damages, then the additional clause pur-
porting to exclude consequential damages is again irrelevant.319 In other
words, under this early reading of the Code, an additional contract clause
purporting to exclude consequential damages under UCC section 2-
719(3) would have been irrelevant if the seller had also sought to limit the
buyer's remedy under UCC section 2-719(1).32o
Since rational parties would not normally draft irrelevant contract
terms, this is not a particularly compelling interpretation of the Code. A
more convincing interpretation, and the one that dominates recent case
law,32 l would give an independent effect to any contract clause that
sought to exclude consequential damages. Under this approach, whether
the exclusion of consequential damages was effective would be com-
pletely independent of whether the limitation of remedy failed its essen-
tial purpose.2 Thus, the limitation of remedy would be effective as long
as it did not fail of its essential purpose; as long as it was effective, the
exclusion of consequential damages clause would be irrelevant. But if the
limitation of remedy failed of its essential purpose, the exclusion of con-
sequential damages clause would remain effective unless a court deter-
the parties. See id. Merchants are usually presumed to be relatively sophisticated in bar-
gaining. See GILLETTrE & WALT, supra note 201, at 176-83.





322. See id. at 387-89.
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mined that it also failed for independent reasons.32 The clause excluding
consequential damages would provide an additional layer of protection
for the seller and would therefore at least serve an intelligible purpose.
Since a contract interpretation that imputes an intelligible purpose to
contract terms seems preferable to one that does not, this appears to be
the more compelling approach.
In a recent line of cases, however, the Ninth Circuit has confounded the
question by adopting a third approach. To begin with, in S.M. Wilson &
Co. v. Smith International, Inc.,324 the Ninth Circuit found no state court
precedent to follow, but it predicted that California courts would treat
the failure of a limited remedy clause and the effectiveness of an exclu-
sion of consequential damages clause as independent questions.32 The
court upheld an exclusion of consequential damages clause even though
the limitation of remedy clause failed of its essential purpose.3  By itself,
this was no great departure from the drift of the case law. The court but-
tressed the rationale for its holding, however, by stating that "[t]he de-
fault of the seller is not so total and fundamental as to require that its
consequential damage limitation be expunged from the contract. ''327 It
may well have been true that Smith's default was not total and fundamen-
tal, but whatever that standard might mean, it does not derive from Arti-
cle 222' The Ninth Circuit seemed to suggest that if Smith's breach had
been total and fundamental, this would have justified expunging the ex-
clusion of consequential damages from the contract regardless of the
UCC.
3 2 9
Since this was merely dicta, it did not by itself mark a departure from
the dominant approach, but in hindsight, it foreshadowed a drift in the
court's jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit subsequently revisited the ques-
tion in Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., a case that arose under Washing-
ton law. 330 The buyer in that case had contracted for the purchase of thir-
teen dump truck bodies.13' The seller had created an express warranty
that the truck bodies would be suitable for the purpose of transporting
323. In other words, it would remain effective as long as it was not unconscionable or it
did not apply to consequential damages for personal injuries suffered by a consumer. See
U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2002).
324. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
325. Id. at 1375.
326. Id. ("Consequential damages were assigned to the buyer, Wilson .... The seller
Smith did not ignore his obligation to repair; he simply was unable to perform it. This is
not enough to require that the seller absorb losses the buyer plainly agreed to bear.").
327. Id.
328. Id.; see supra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
329. See S.M. Wilson, 587 F.2d at 1375.
330. Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1984).
331. Id. at 1310.
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wet concrete.332 When the seller's warrant turned out not to be true, the
seller made no attempt to repair or replace the truck bodies.333 The ques-
tion of the effect of the failure of the limitation of remedy clause on the
exclusion of consequential damages went to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth
Circuit reiterated its adherence to the "case-by-case" approach to deter-
mining whether the two clauses were inseparable parts of the risk alloca-
tion or independent. 334 However, this time, the Ninth Circuit held that
the exclusion of consequential damages was ineffective.335 The Ninth
Circuit quoted directly from the trial court's opinion: "It cannot be main-
tained that it was the parties' intention that Defendant be enabled to
avoid all consequential liability for breach by first agreeing to an alterna-
tive remedy provision designed to avoid consequential harms, and then
scuttling that alternative remedy through its recalcitrance in honoring the
agreement. ,
3 6
Setting aside any questions about whether a limitation of remedy clause
is intended to prevent consequential harms 337 the most striking implica
tion of this quotation is that the court apparently did not read the exclu-
sion of consequential damages clause as separate and distinct from the
limitation of remedy clause. Of course, if the exclusion of consequential
damages is not made in a clause separate and distinct from the limitation
of remedy clause, then it cannot stand as a separate clause of the con-
tract.338 Since there is no other independent clause limiting the buyer's
damages, the failure of the limitation of remedy clause is then tanta-
mount to the failure of the limitation on the buyer's right to consequen-
339tial damages. Perhaps, viewed in this light, Fiorito did not mark such a
drastic departure from the case law either.
The Ninth Circuit revisited the question yet again in Milgard Temper-
ing, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of America.34° This time, its treatment of the prob-
lem marked a clear departure from the dominant approach. In Milgard,
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1311.
334. Id. at 1314-15.
335. Id. at 1315.
336. Id. (emphasis omitted).
337. It seems clear that such a clause is not directly intended to do so. Rather, it is
directly intended to limit the buyer's remedy for breaches (and the seller's exposure to
liabilities), regardless of whether consequential harms were incurred. Of course, a buyer
may reasonably believe that if the limited remedy serves its essential purpose, there will be
no consequential harms.
338. See Howard Foss, When to Apply the Doctrine of Failure of Essential Purpose to
an Exclusion of Consequential Damages: An Objective Approach, 25 DUQ. L. REV. 551,
564 (1987).
339. See Douglas E. Phillips, When Software Fails: Emerging Standards of Vendor
Liability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 BUS. LAW. 151, 175 (1994).
340. Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703,706 (9th Cir. 1990).
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the buyer transacted for the design and delivery of a tempering furnace
through what the court described as a "carefully-negotiated contract."341
The seller, Selas, regarded the design of the furnace as "experimental"
but agreed to deliver it for what the court clearly regarded as a hefty
price of $1,450,000.34' The contract also included some timeliness provi-
sions.343 When Selas was unable to meet these provisions, the parties ini-
tially settled out of court; however, when Selas failed to perform within
the additional period provided under the settlement agreement, Milgard
filed suit.344 The trial court granted Selas' motion for summary judgment,
but the appellate court overturned and remanded the case. 345 On remand,
the trial court held that the limited remedy clause failed of its essential
purpose, and that Selas' default was sufficiently fundamental to nullify
the exclusion of consequential damages.3 Milgard was awarded over
one million dollars in net damages.347
Selas appealed the trial court's ruling on two grounds: first, that the
trial court erred in holding that the limited remedy clause failed of its
essential purpose; second, that the trial court erred in holding that the
failure of the limited remedy invalidated the exclusion of consequential
damages.348 Judge Hall summarily upheld the trial court's ruling on the
issue of the failure of the limited remedy clause, and then addressed the
question of consequential damages at greater length.349 He rejected the
notion that a characterization of the seller's breach as "total and funda-
mental" had any bearing on the effectiveness of an exclusion of conse-
quential damages clause and reiterated the court's aversion to "talismanic
analysis., 350 As Judge Hall explained, the appropriate test was "whether
Selas' default caused a loss which was not part of the bargained-for allo-
cation of risk. 351 Indeed, this was the test that the trial court had actually
applied, and Judge Hall therefore upheld the trial court's "decision to lift
the cap on consequential damages. 3 52 As Judge Hall explained, "Milgard
did not agree to pay $1.45 million in order to participate in a science ex-
periment.
''153
341. Id. at 705.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 706.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 709.
347. Id. at 710.
348. See id. at 709.
349. Id. at 706-09.
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Here, Judge Hall not only departed from the drift of the case law but
he came close to contradicting some of the fundamental principles of
modern contract law. The opinion reprints both the limited remedy and
the exclusion of consequential damages clauses, which were contained in
the same paragraph of the writing?.4 This paragraph provided:
In the event of a breach of any warranty, express, implied or
statutory, or in the event the equipment is found to be defective
in workmanship or material or fails to conform to the specifica-
tions thereof, [Selas'] liability shall be limited to the repair or re-
placement of such equipment as is found to be defective or non-
conforming, provided that written notice of any such defect or
non-conformity must be given to Selas within 1 year from the
date of acceptance, or 15 months from completion of shipment,
whichever first occurs. In the event that acceptance is delayed
through the fault of Selas, then the Selas 1 year warranty shall be
applicable and shall not begin until the date of acceptance. Selas
assumes no liability for no [sic] consequential or incidental dam-
ages of any kind (including fire or explosion in the starting, test-
ing, or subsequent operation of the equipment), and the Pur-
chaser assumes all liability for the consequences of its use or mis-
use by the Purchaser or his employees. In no event will Selas be
liable for damages resulting from the non-operation of Pur-
chaser's plant, loss of product, raw materials or production as a
result of the use, misuse or inability to use the equipment covered
by this proposal .... "'
A plain reading of this paragraph clearly indicates that the limitation of
remedy and exclusion of consequential damages clauses were separate
and distinct. Structurally, the limitation of remedy is contained in the
first sentence, and the exclusion of consequential damages is contained in
the subsequent two sentences. In fact, the second sentence excludes con-
sequential damages associated with the use or misuse of the furnace, and
the third sentence excludes any damages associated with the buyer's in-
ability to use the furnace. The damages that Milgard incurred consisted
primarily of lost profits as a result of its inability to use the furnace.'-"
These damages should have been excluded by the third sentence. The
wording was clear that "[iun no event" should Selas have been liable for
damages resulting from Milgard's inability to use the furnace.3 57 Pre-
sumably, that was meant to include the event that the limited remedy
failed of its essential purpose. Together with the fact that this third sen-
354. Id. at 707.
355. Id. at 707 n.4 (first alteration in original) (emphasis omitted).
356. Id. at 710.
357. Id. at 707 n.4.
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tence is separated from the limitation of remedy clause by the second
sentence, the wording clearly implies that the exclusion of consequential
damages was separate and distinct from the limitation of remedy, and
intended to provide Selas with an additional layer of protection.
Judge Hall nonetheless nullified the effect of this exclusion of damages
on the grounds that the parties had not bargained for the exclusion. A
clear clause in a writing is normally evidence of what the parties had bar-
gained for, especially when the court characterizes the contract as one
that was carefully negotiated. 9 In this case, however, Judge Hall looked
to Milgard's consideration - a price of $1,450,000- and inferred that the
exclusion of consequential damages was not part of the bargain. Al-
though the inclusion of a clause limiting the buyer's right to damages in a
contract with such a high price might be considered so grossly unfair as to
shock a court's conscience, this by itself could only satisfy one prong of
the test for unconsctonalty.361 For the unconscionability doctrine to
apply, there must also have been some procedural abuse in the negotia-
tion of the contract that exposed the party to an unfair surprise. Since
the court acknowledged that the contract in this case was carefully nego-
tiated, 63 that could hardly have been the case.
Judge Hall seemed to believe that Milgard could not possibly have
agreed to such a sweeping exclusion of consequential damages. As he
put it, "Milgard did not agree to pay $1.45 million [for a] science experi-
ment. ' '364 But here, Judge Hall came very close to contradicting one of
the fundamental principles of modern contract law, alternatively known
as the "adequacy doctrine" or the "peppercorn theory., 365 Under the
peppercorn theory,36 courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consid-
eration in determining whether there is an enforceable contract; the mere
fact of consideration itself is sufficient.367 In Milgard, Judge Hall looked
to the buyer's consideration as evidence of what the buyer had bargained
for, and concluded that it must have been more than a furnace with a
358. Id. at 709.
359. Id. at 705.
360. Id. at 709.
361. See supra note 316.
362. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2002) ("The principle is one of the prevention of oppres-
sion and unfair surprise .... ).
363. Milgard, 902 F.2d at 705.
364. Id. at 709.
365. See 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS BENDER, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS: FORMATION OF CONTRACTS § 5.14, at 70-71 (rev. ed. 1995).
366. The term derives from the common law maxim that "even something as trifling in
value as a peppercorn could serve as consideration for a bargain." ROBERT E. ScOTr &
DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 127 (2d ed. 1993).
367. See Batsakis v. Demotsis, 226 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ("Mere in-
adequacy of consideration will not void a contract.").
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limited remedy and no consequential damages, regardless of whether the
limited remedy failed of its essential purpose.368 But the parties' writing
clearly included a separate and distinct clause excluding consequential
damages. Judge Hall looked to Milgard's consideration (primarily the
contract price) as evidence of Selas' consideration-whether Selas was to
provide consequential damages in the event its limited remedy failed.
69
In treating Milgard's consideration as evidence that Selas' consideration
must have been more than merely a furnace with a limited remedy and
no consequential damages, even though there was a separate and distinct
contract clause that clearly excluded consequential damages, Judge Hall
came close to holding that Selas' consideration was inadequate. 70
Some commentators have written favorably about this approach to the
problem.37' While there is nothing in principle wrong with a court looking
to the parties' consideration as a means of determining the scope of their
bargain, Judge Hall's opinion in Milgard goes further. It looks to the
buyer's consideration to trump a separate and distinct clause in the writ-
ing excluding consequential damages. To put the matter in perspective,
could Judge Hall have held that the contract price was not, in fact,
$1,450,000 despite the clear evidence otherwise, simply because the writ-
ing included a clause excluding consequential damages and because no
sensible buyer would have paid that much for the furnace without the
right to consequential damages in the event that the limited remedy
failed? The only circumstance that prevents Judge Hall's decision from
blatantly violating the adequacy of consideration doctrine is some linger-
ing doubt about whether the clause excluding consequential damages was
truly understood by the buyer to be separate and distinct from the limited
remedy clause.372
Fortunately, Judge Hall's decision has not been widely followed.73
Nonetheless, it injects some additional uncertainty into many commercial
sales transactions. Sellers who wish to provide themselves with a layer of
protection against consequential damages claims beyond the one pro-
368. Milgard, 902 F.2d at 709.
369. Id.
370. See id.; supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
371. See, e.g., GILLETTE & WALT, supra note 201, at 388.
372. See Milgard, 902 F.2d at 712-13.
373. Id. Although at least two other courts have purported to follow a similar case-by-
case approach, a careful reading of these cases indicates that neither of them relied on the
size of the buyer's consideration to trump a separate and distinct clause excluding conse-
quential damages. See, e.g., Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587, 591-93 (4th
Cir. 1985); V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d 864, 868-69 (7th Cir. 1971). Some
courts have clearly rejected the Milgard approach. See, e.g., Golden Reward Mining Co. v.
Jervis B. Webb Co., 772 F. Supp. 1118, 1124-25 (D.S.D. 1991); Pierce v. Catalina Yachts,
Inc., 2 P.3d 618, 622 (Alaska 2000).
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vided by a limited remedy clause may have difficulty in doing So. 374 Writ-
ing a separate and distinct clause that clearly excludes consequential
damages may not be enough. In the event of a dispute a court may de-
cide to follow the Ninth Circuit's precedent in Milgard, and hold that the
buyer's consideration is sufficiently large to trump a plain reading of the
writing.
D. A Return to Swift v. Tyson?
These three cases offer concrete examples of how federal courts in
three different circuits have used their discretion in conscious attempts to
reinterpret and revise modern sales law. In Advent, Judge Weis of the
Third Circuit held that computer software was a good within the meaning
of Article 2, even though the question was not directly raised by the case;
he thus sought to bring within the scope of the UCC a wide range of
transactions in computer information that might otherwise have been
governed by state common law.375 In Hill v. Gateway, Judge Easterbrook
of the Seventh Circuit followed a dubious precedent instead of the letter
of Article 2 in a bold attempt to revise the rules of contract formation
. . • 176
and legitimize "terms later" contracts in sales transactions. Finally, in
Milgard, Judge Hall of the Ninth Circuit stretched the case-by-case ap-
proach to determining the effectiveness of damage exclusion clauses
when limited remedy clauses fail, and as a result, he came very close to
contradicting the adequacy of consideration doctrine.377 In each case, the
court based its holding on policy considerations rather than state legal
authorities or predictions about how the state supreme court would rule.
And in each case, one wonders whether a state court would have felt em-
boldened or motivated to render a similar holding in the face of the same
questions.
In Advent, the Third Circuit overruled the district court's decision to
apply Pennsylvania common law instead of Article 2.378 Judge Weis
looked to the language used in the writing, the manner of billing, and the
nature of the items that had been contracted for in a manner consistent
with the predominant factor test.379 He could have easily held that Article
2 applied on this basis alone without also holding that computer software
is a good. Indeed, one wonders whether the Pennsylvania Superior Court
374. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
375. Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991).
376. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997).
377. Milgard, 902 F.2d at 708-10; see also discussion supra Part III.A.
378. Advent, 925 F.2d at 676.
379. Id. at 674.
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would have done the same. Since the holding was completely unneces-
sary to the disposition of the case, any state court judge should have
feared being overruled on the matter by the state supreme court. More-
over, one wonders whether any state court judge would have had the
same motivation to extend the scope of Article 2. Was the volume of
contract cases involving computer software in Pennsylvania large enough
to have made the matter so important? Judge Weis purported to apply
Pennsylvania law to the case, but it is clear that he looked well beyond
Pennsylvania's borders when making his utilitarian calculations.
Similar observations can be made about Hill v. Gateway and Milgard.
In Hill v. Gateway, Judge Easterbrook declined to follow Article 2, even
though it seemed to offer a clear answer to the question raised by the
case.38' Would any judge on the Circuit Court of Illinois have ignored the
state statute in favor of a Seventh Circuit precedent that clearly also ig-
nored the state statute?8 That is difficult to imagine. Would any judge
on the Circuit Court of Illinois -subject to reelection every six years"'-
have disregarded an Illinois statute to take the side of a corporate com-
puter manufacturer against a consumer? That is also difficult to imagine.
It is perhaps easier to imagine how a judge on the Washington Court of
Appeals38 could have relied on the size of the contract price to invalidate
an exclusion of consequential damages clause, as Judge Hall did in Mil-
gard.383 But it is still not easy. Judge Hall's holding in Milgard developed
a line of jurisprudence that the Ninth Circuit began in S.M. Wilson and
continued in Fiorito.3'8 In S.M Wilson, the Ninth Circuit purported to
apply California law and in Fiorito, it purported to apply Washington
law.3 8 The Ninth Circuit thus predicted that the state supreme courts in
both California and Washington would depart from the dominant ap-
proach in favor of a case-by-case analysis.388 How plausible is that?
Judge Hall's deference to Washington law in Milgard was obviously no
380. For an overview of the Pennsylvania state court system, see Pennsylvania's Uni-
fied Judicial System, http://www.courts.state.pa.us/index/UJS/indexujs.asp (last visited Feb.
12, 2007).
381. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1149-50.
382. For an overview of the Illinois state court system, see Illinois Government: Judici-
ary, http://www.illinois.gov/government/judiciary.cfin (last visited Feb. 12,2007).
383. See Illinois Courts: About the Circuit Court, http://www.state.il.us/court/circuit
courts/cccourt.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
384. For an overview of the Washington state court system, see Washington Courts:
Appellate and Trial Courts, http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate-trial_courts/ (last visited
Feb. 12,2007).
385. Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703,709 (9th Cir. 1990).
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more than a formality; the Ninth Circuit was clearly developing its own
jurisprudence.
All three cases illustrate how the federal courts have often used their
discretion in conscious attempts to reinterpret and revise modern sales
law. Indeed, they illustrate how little regard the federal courts have
sometimes paid to state legal authorities or to their obligation to predict
how a state supreme court would rule on the same question in sales law
cases. Instead, as the examples suggest, they have often looked to
broader policy considerations in attempts to fashion rules that are not
only consonant with their utilitarian calculations but will transcend juris-
dictional boundaries. In this regard, they are behaving much as if they
were still in the Swift v. Tyson era, when the federal courts commonly
appealed to the law of the merchant in attempts to construct a body of
general commercial law that cohered with the underlying principles of
commerce.
CONCLUSION
Almost seventy years after the Supreme Court sought to rationalize the
American system of judicial federalism in Erie, sales law remains trapped
in a pattern more reminiscent of the Swift v. Tyson era. The extraordi-
narily wide separation of powers in the NCCUSL-ALI uniform lawmak-
ing process has entrenched Article 2 of the UCC in the status quo. Con-
currently, an imbalance between the federal and state courts in the
American system of judicial federalism has conferred an unusually wide
range of discretion over state commercial law on the federal courts.
Ironically, therefore, state sales statutes are being reinterpreted and re-
vised by the federal courts rather than the state legislatures or state
courts. The federal courts are thus the most important source of innova-
tion and experimentation in modern American sales law. However, the
role they play is not entirely consistent with modern notions of democ-
racy and judicial restraint. Moreover, it is debatable whether they have
brought much rationality and coherence to the law or simply injected
uncertainty and disharmony instead.
At this point, it appears that the pattern will persist. Thus, the federal
courts will probably remain the most important source of new develop-
ments in sales law for some time to come. But it is doubtful whether
these developments will converge and therefore whether sales law will
remain uniform. Indeed, the converse seems far more likely. Neither
federal nor state courts have rushed to follow cases such as Advent, Hill
v. Gateway, and Milgard, which have rendered important new holdings
on fundamental questions of the law, and it appears unlikely that they
will do so anytime soon. It seems inevitable that American sales law will
continue to diverge, not only across jurisdictions, but also by moving fur-
ther and further away from the rickety framework of Article 2. Ameri-
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can sales law therefore will not only continue to devolve into something
more akin to the common law but will remain an area of disjunction in
which the federal courts play the dominant role in developing the law,
even though the law is still formally within the authority of the states.
